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IMPLEMENTATION OF A LIGHTWEIGHT TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE
SUMMARY
Today’s computing platforms are becoming more and more mobile and networked,
while their tasks get increasingly critical. Therefore, the need to verify and identify that
a local or remote computing platform behaves as expected has become an important
challenge. Software and hardware attestation protocols have been proposed to solve
this problem in the past few years. While many vulnerabilities and attacks have been
discovered against the proposed software based solutions, hardware based solutions are
too costly for lightweight embedded devices. Recently, lightweight solutions requiring
minor hardware changes have been proposed for the low-end embedded devices. One
of the state of the art approaches is SMART (Secure and Minimal Architecture for
Root of Trust), in which memory accesses are controlled by looking at the program
counter (PC), proposed by El Defrawy et al.
In this thesis, SMART is designed for 8051 platform on a Spartan 6 CGS324 FPGA.
This is the first implementation of SMART architecture that shows the cost of the
modifications to hardware in terms of area and speed. In addition, a novel hardware
architecture that changes memory access layout in order to provide better attestation
program in terms of code size and speed is proposed. It is shown that the size of
additional program code decreased by 36% and attestation speed is increased by 12%
while the area and speed of hardware is optimized.
Moreover, 224 bit SHA3 (KECCAK[r=40, c=160]) software is implemented for 8051
by using assembly (ASM) and C programming languages with SDCC compiler. The
trade off between code size and speed of SHA3[r=40, c=160] is presented with several
implementations. No other SHA3[200] implementation for 8051 can be found in the
literature at the time of this thesis is written.
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GÖMÜLÜ SI˙STEMLER I˙ÇI˙N GÜVENI˙LI˙R PLATFORM MODÜLÜ TASARIMI
ÖZET
Gömülü sistemler, özel bir amaca hizmet etmek amacıyla gerçek zaman ihtiyaçlarına
cevap verebilecek s¸ekilde genellikle kısıtlı donanımlar üzerinde tasarlanan, güç
sınırlamalarına uyan ve çevre birimleri ile uyumlu olarak çalıs¸an bilgisayar
platformlarıdır. Düs¸ük performans gereksinimli gömülü sistemler haberles¸me, tıp,
savunma, otomotiv gibi hemen hemen her alanda görülmektedir.
Kullanım alanı her geçen gün daha fazla genis¸leyen gömülü sistemler kalp pilleri,
otomobil frenleri, fabrika otomasyon sistemleri gibi kritik uygulamalarda daha fazla
yer almaktadır. Artan kritik görevlerinin yanında gömülü sistemler daha çok
uygulamada internet veya yerel bir ag˘ üzerinden bas¸ka bilgisayarlara bag˘lı olarak
kullanılmaktadır. Genel amaçlı bilgisayar platformlarının güvenlig˘inin sag˘lanması ve
sistemin güvenlig˘inin dog˘rulanması üzerine birçok çalıs¸manın bulunmasına rag˘men
yakın zamanlara kadar düs¸ük performans gereksinimli gömülü sistemler bu konuda
ihmal edildi. Ancak bu sistemleri hedef alan birçok saldırı literatürde bulunmaktadır.
Vücuda yerles¸tirilen insulin pompası medikal cihazlarına yapılan saldırılar, arabaların
kontrolör ag˘ına (CAN) yapılan saldırılar ve Stuxnet bilgisayar kurdunun Iran nükleer
tesislerine bulas¸arak programlanabilir mantıksal denetleyici (PLC) sistemlerinin
yazılımını deg˘is¸tirmesi bunların örneklerindendir.
Günümüzde bilgisayar platformları fiziksel olarak güvenli yerlerde korunabilmesine
rag˘men, ag˘ üzerinden yapılan saldırılara ve zararlı yazılımlara kars¸ı daha hassastır.
Sistem güvenlig˘inin sag˘lanması amacıyla önerilen önemli özelliklerden biri uzaktan
dog˘rulamadır. Yerel veya uzakta çalıs¸an bir bilgisayarın kimlig˘inin dog˘rulanması ve
çalıs¸masının beklenildig˘i gibi olmasının dog˘ru bir s¸ekilde kontrol edilebilmesi güvenli
bir uzaktan dog˘rulama protokolü ile sag˘lanabilmektedir.
Uzaktan dog˘rulama yöntemi, dog˘rulayıcı (verifier) olarak isimlendirilen güvenilir
bir bilgisayar sistemi ve sag˘layıcı (provider) olarak isimlendirilen, ag˘ üzerinden
bag˘lanılan, güvenilirlig˘inin kontrol edilmesi gereken bilgisayar sisteminden olus¸ur.
Uzaktan dog˘rulama protokolü dog˘rulayıcının isteg˘i üzerine bas¸lar. Dog˘rulayıcı her
bir hesaplamayı taze tutmak amacıyla sag˘layıcıya yeterli büyüklükte rastgele bir
sayı iletir. Ardından sag˘layıcı; sistem durumunu, iletilen rastgele sayıyı ve sadece
dog˘rulayıcının bildig˘i bir s¸ifreyi kullanarak bu giris¸lere özel bir sag˘lama toplamı
(checksum) üretir. Sag˘lama toplamı, her bir giris¸i için yeterince farklı bir sonuç
üreten tek yönlü bir fonksiyon sonucudur. Sag˘layıcının sistem durumu, hafızaları
(memory), saklayıcıları (register) gibi yazılımın saklanmasını ve is¸letilmesini gösteren
donanımlarının kontrol edildig˘i andaki içerikleridir. Sag˘lama toplamının s¸ifre
kullanılarak üretilmesi hesaplama sonucunu sag˘layıcıya özel yapar ve hesaplamanın
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simüle edilebilmesini engeller. Son adım olarak sag˘lama toplamı dog˘rulayıcıya iletilir.
Dog˘rulayıcı, kendisine iletilen sag˘lama toplamının bekledig˘i gibi olması durumunda
sag˘layıcının güvenli bir s¸ekilde çalıs¸tıg˘ı sonucuna varır.
Uzaktan dog˘rulama statik ve dinamik olmak üzere ikiye ayrılır. Dinamik
dog˘rulamada sistem çalıs¸ırken dahi güvenilirlik protokolü gerçekles¸tirilebilirken,
statik dog˘rulamada ise sistem sadece bas¸langıçta kontrol edilebilir.
Yakın zamanlara kadar düs¸ük performanslı gömülü sistemlerde uygulanması için
önerilen uzaktan dog˘rulama protokolleri sadece yazılım veya sadece donanım
tasarımlarına yönelikti. Sadece yazılımın kullanıldıg˘ı yöntemler genellikle sag˘lama
toplamının hesaplanması sırasında geçen zamanın da dog˘rulayıcı tarafından kontrol
edilmesi fikrine dayanır. Bu sistemlerde, sag˘lama toplamının beklenen zaman
aralıg˘ında hesaplanmaması durumunda fazladan is¸lem yaptırıldıg˘ı ve sag˘layıcının
zararlı bir yazılım tarafından ele geçirildig˘i varsayılır. Sadece donanım tasarımına
yönelik yöntemler, sag˘lama toplamının hesaplanması için sag˘layıcı platforma ek bir
is¸lemci veya Güvenilir Platform Modülü (Trusted Platform Module, TPM) olarak
isimlendirilen özelles¸tirilmis¸ bir yonga eklenmesi fikrine dayanır. Sadece yazılımın
kullanıldıg˘ı sistemlere kars¸ı bas¸arılı birçok saldırının literatürde yer almasının yanında
sadece donanımın kullanıldıg˘ı yöntemler bu çalıs¸mada hedef olarak belirlenen
is¸lemciler için pahalı olmaktadır.
S¸imdilerde donanım ve yazılımın birlikte tasarımıyla daha düs¸ük performans
özelliklerine sahip gömülü sistemleri hedef alan yöntemler gelis¸tirildi. Bu metotlar
donanımda ufak deg˘is¸iklikler önererek yazılım tarafından güvenli bir dog˘rulama
protokolü gerçeklemesini mümkün kılmaktadır. SMART (Secure and Minimal
Architecture for Root of Trust, Güvenilirlik Kökü için Güvenli ve Minimum Tasarım)
bu alandaki en güncel ve önemli çözümlerden biridir.
SMART yönteminde, dog˘rulama programını saklamak üzere ve sag˘layıcı s¸ifresini
saklamak üzere is¸lemciye program bellekleri eklenir. Dog˘rulama programının veya
s¸ifrenin deg˘is¸meyeceg˘i durumlarda salt okunur bellek tercih edilir. Güncellenebilir
bellekler kullanabilmek içinse is¸lemcinin yazılımı tarafından deg˘is¸tirilemeyecek
güvenli bir protokol eklenir. Ayrıca is¸lemci ve veri bellekleri arasına bellek
eris¸imlerini kontrol etmek üzere ufak bir denetleme devresi eklenir. Eklenen denetleme
devresi is¸lemcinin program sayıcısının deg˘erlerini takip ederek bellek eris¸imlerini
kontrol eder. Uzaktan dog˘rulamada kullanılmak üzere saklanan s¸ifrenin, sadece
dog˘rulama yazılımı tarafından okunmasını sag˘lar. Ayrıca dog˘rulama programının
sadece ilk direktifinden uyarılabilmesini ve bölünmeden çalıs¸tırılıp son direktifinden
çıkabilmesini sag˘lar. Herhangi bir ihlalde sistemi sıfırlar ve üçüncü bir kis¸iye
veri akıs¸ını engeller. Böylece dog˘rulama yazılımının beklenildig˘i gibi çalıs¸ması
zorlanmıs¸ olunur. Dog˘rulama yazılımı dog˘rulayıcının isteg˘i üzerine çalıs¸tırılır ve
uzaktan dog˘rulama protokolüne uyarak s¸ifreyi, sistem durumunu ve kendisine iletilen
rastgele sayıyı kullanarak bir sag˘lama toplamı hesaplar. Hesaplanan sag˘lama toplamı
dog˘rulayıcıya iletilir.
Bu çalıs¸mada düs¸ük performans özelliklerine sahip gömülü sistemler için dinamik
uzaktan dog˘rulama yöntemi olarak önerilen SMART, Intel 8051 is¸lemcisi için
tasarlanmıs¸tır. 8051 is¸lemcisi standarda uygun olarak tasarlanan Dalton çekirdeg˘i
kullanılarak Spartan 6 CSG324 Sahada Programlanabilir Kapı Dizileri (Field
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Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) üzerine gömülmüs¸tür. I˙s¸lemcinin donanımı
SMART yapısına uygun olarak deg˘is¸tirilmis¸tir.
Dog˘rulama yazılımı tasarımında sag˘lama toplamını üretmek üzere 224 bit SHA3[r=40,
c=60] (Secure Hash Algorithm, Güvenli Hash Algoritması) seçilmis¸tir. Hash
algoritması herhangi uzunluktaki bir veriden sabit uzunluktaki bir deg˘eri tek yönlü
olarak hesaplar ve farklı giris¸ler için farklı çıkıs¸lar üretir. Güvenli hash algoritmaları,
Amerika Birles¸ik Devletleri Standart ve Teknolojiler Enstitüsü (NIST) tarafından
belirlenmis¸ standartlardır. SHA3 algoritması, 2007 yılında NIST tarafından duyurulan
ve 2012 ye kadar süren bir yarıs¸manın kazananıdır. Bir s¸ifre kullanarak sag˘lama
toplamı üreten hash algoritmalarına mesaj dog˘rulama kodları (MAC, message
authentication code) denir. SHA3 algoritması, mesaj dog˘rulama kodu üretecek s¸ekilde
yapılandırılıp SDCC derleyicisi kullanılarak 8051 için tasarlanmıs¸tır. Program önce
C programlama dili kullanılarak tasarlanmıs¸ ve optimize edilmis¸tir. Daha sonra
assembly (ASM) kullanılarak hedeflenen platform için hızlandırılmıs¸tır. Sonuç olarak
SHA3[200] ün kod boyutu ve hızı arasındaki oran tasarlanan kodlarla gösterilmis¸tir.
Bu çalıs¸ma SHA3[200] algoritmasının 8051 üzerinde gerçeklemesini göstermesi
açısından da bir ilk olma özellig˘i tas¸ır.
Bu tez SMART sisteminin donanım ve yazılım üzerindeki alan ve hız açısından yükünü
gösteren ilk çalıs¸madır. Sistemin herhangi bir is¸lemci için gerçeklenmesi sırasında
kars¸ılas¸ılabilecek zorluklar gösterilmis¸tir. Buna ek olarak SMART sisteminin bellek
yapısını deg˘is¸tirerek alan ve hız açısından daha hızlı bir program tasarımına olanak
tanıyan ve SMART sisteminin platforma olan yükünü azaltan bir yöntem önerilmis¸tir.
Önerilen yöntemde dog˘rulama yazılımına rezerv edilmis¸ bir veri belleg˘i eklenmis¸tir.
Bu sayede dog˘rulama yazılımı küçültülebilmis¸ ve daha hızlı çalıs¸tırılabilmis¸tir. Sonuç
olarak önerilen sistem için tasarlanan dog˘rulama yazılımının % 36 daha küçük ve % 12
daha hızlı oldug˘u gösterilmis¸tir.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Embedded devices are being used more and more widely and they are becoming more
and more networked while their tasks are getting more critical [10]. Unfortunately, any
programmable device is vulnerable to malware and a significant fraction of the devices
that are connected to internet is infected with malware [10].
Medical, automotive and banking applications can be given as examples where
embedded devices are highly used in a networked scheme while strong security
requirements are necessary. Implantable medical devices (IMDs), like insulin pumps,
can be designed to be accessed via home readers through a Radio Frequency
(RF) channel [7]. In-car systems are networked and can be connected to internet.
Confidential data and cryptographic keys are handled in payment terminals.
E-Services, outsourcing of services, mobile devices or digital rights management can
be given as additional examples where system security is vital. Integrity is essential
in an election using e-voting mechanism [11]. Confidentiality and security of medical
records must be provided when they are used in e-services. Sale, usage and enterprise
of digital contents are other examples of security needed systems. Sale of products
using e-banking needs secure money transfer over the public internet. Supporting
controlled usage like limited time of access to the product or protecting private copies
from fraud is only possible with a secure system running on a trusted platform.
There are a lot of work about the security of general purpose devices but embedded
devices are neglected. However, some attacks have appeared targeting low cost
embedded devices recently. The computer worm Stuxnet [12], targeting the Siemens
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), spread to Iran’s nuclear facilities and broke
the automation system. In addition to that a lot of attacks against embedded
systems, e.g. insulin pumps hack [13], automotive controllers hack [14], implantable
cardioverter defibrillator hack [15], are presented in the literature. A good summary of
attack methods on embedded systems can be found in [16, 17].
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Figure 1.1: Remote Attestation Scheme.
Secure execution of the code in a platform is crucial. Likewise, the need to verify and
identify that a local or remote computing platform behaves as expected has become an
important challenge in order to gain trust [11]. One common solution to this challenge
is remote attestation. Most of the attacks targeting embedded devices are deployed
over the network instead of physical action. These concerns also motivate building a
secure remote attestation mechanism.
1.1 Remote Attestation
Remote attestation is a two party protocol used to gain assurance that a local or remote
computing platform behaves as expected. A basic remote attestation scheme can be
seen in Figure 1.1. The scheme is based on challenge response mechanism. Prover is
the device needed to be attested. A secure fresh evidence about provers internal state
is produced and sent to verifier over a network when it is requested.
Basic steps of the remote attestation protocol that are given in Figure 1.1 are as
follows: (1) Verifier produces a random number nonce, which is for the freshness of the
attestation result, and sends it to the prover. (2) Prover calculates a checksum, which
is generally calculated using cryptographic hash functions, using platform specific
properties and nonce. The checksum is calculated in a way that it is specific to the
platforms state and its unfeasible to be produced with a simulation of the scheme. (3)
Verifier checks the checksum, then identifies and verifies the prover. As a result any
corruption of the platform is detected. In a real life scenario verifier can be a trusted
server and the prover can be an embedded device that is deployed to the field.
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Remote attestation protocols can be classified as static and dynamic attestation. The
state of a device can be verified at the run-time in the dynamic attestation. Different
remote attestation protocols are proposed from purely hardware based to software
based approaches for high end devices to low cost embedded devices.
1.2 Related Work
Different techniques are proposed for higher end devices in order to strength security.
Using hardware security features to provide strong software isolation and securely
support remote attestation are some significant research lines. Deploying hardware
features to provide privileged levels and virtual memory support for operating system
is one solution. Operating system can support isolated processes and guard their
interactions in this way. Creating memory safe virtual machines or deploying
hypervisors, which monitors the execution, with the support of hardware are other
research lines aiming to provide isolation of programs sharing same physical device.
Existing hardware based approaches are based on adding a chip that cannot even be
compromised by the owner. Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a recent industrial
initiative towards the standardization of attestation specified Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) [18] as the standard for reporting of a platform’s software state. One can
make provable statements about the platform configuration and protect keys from
multiple users by using TPMs and secure co-processors. However, these approaches
are focused on general-purpose hardware and they are still too costly for low-cost
embedded devices like wireless sensor networks. Dynamic root of trust mechanism is
provided by the TPM specification so attestation can be done not only before but also
after the boot process. Intel TXT [19] and AMD SVM are some commodity product
examples.
Software based solutions are proposed in order to be used in resource constrained
platforms [20–24]. These methods provides attestation capability without relying on
any hardware. A checksum is computed using a software function that uses side effects
of computation like the execution time and any unexpected overhead is detected.
However, current software based remote attestation methods rely on too restrictive
assumptions for many realistic applications and expect no collusion which means that
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the verifier should be linked directly to the prover without using a network [25]. In
addition, many vulnerabilities and attacks have been discovered against them [25, 26].
Recently, lightweight solutions requiring minor hardware changes have been proposed
for the low-end embedded devices [2, 5–7]. Schultz [5] et. al. proposes a
physical unclonable function (PUF) [27], physical one way function, hardware based
mechanism with combination of software based attestation. Strackx et al. [2] proposes
self-protecting module (SPM) structure and gives the idea of program counter (PC)
based memory controller to create isolated processes. El Defrawy et. al. [7] developed
this idea and designed SMART (Secure and Minimal Architecture for Root of Trust),
which provides dynamic root of trust requiring only a small additional hardware that
checks the PC and controls the memory accesses. Sancus [6] is another method that
offers extensibility using the same PC based idea to create isolated processes. All of
these methods are very promising and very new.
1.3 Conclusion
The background information is given in Section 2, and the term software vulnerability
is explained according to cryptography in Section 3. Then, defense and attestation
mechanisms are summarized in Section 4. The security analysis and abstract
design of the SMART architecture is discussed in Section 5. Finally, software and
hardware implementations of SMART scheme are shown in Section 6 and Section 7,
respectively.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
Necessary background information will be given in this section. Cryptographic
hash functions, secure hash algorithms, message authentication code and hash-based
message authentication code will be explained briefly.
2.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function is a one-way procedure that takes an arbitrary length of
data as input and produces a fixed-length bit string as output in a way that a small
change of the data causes change of the output [28]. Generally, the input of the
function is called the message and the output is called the hash value or the message
digest. An ideal hash function computes the hash value for any given message easily.
A cryptographic hash function must withstand all known types of cryptanalytic attacks
and minimally it must have the following properties [28]:
A hash function
h : X → Y (2.1)
• Preimage resistance: Difficulty of finding any message
x ∈ X (2.2)
from the given hash value
h(x) = y (2.3)
(impossible in ideal one-way function).
• Second preimage resistance: Difficulty of finding another message
x′ ∈ X (2.4)
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that has the same hash value
h(x′) = h(x) ∈ Y (2.5)
for the given message
x ∈ X (2.6)
.
• Collision resistance: Difficulty of finding two different messages
x 6= x′ ∈ X (2.7)
with the same hash value
h(x) = h(x′) ∈ Y (2.8)
.
For an ideal cryptographic hash function, it is infeasible to break these resistance
properties and easy to compute the hash value of any given message. The integrity can
be assured by checking if the message is changed. This can be done using a trusted
verification system for the hash value of a message that works even the message is in
an insecure place [28].
2.3 Secure Hash Algorithms
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a family of
cryptographic hash function standards, called as Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA), as
a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) [29]. First, SHA was designed
and specified in FIPS-180 (1993) [29]. Then, it was revised and specified as SHA-1,
which produces 160-bit hash values, in FIPS-180-1 (1995). Next, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512 algorithms are issued in FIPS 180-2 (2001) [30]. With these algorithms
the security strength is increased by using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [31]
and more compatibility is provided with different output bit lengths. After some
weaknesses of SHA1 [32] and possible threats to SHA2 had been discovered, NIST
announced a public competition to develop a new standard in 2007. 64 candidates were
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submitted in October 2008; 51 of them are selected for the first round in December
2008. They were downsized to 14 by the second round in July 2009 and 5 finalist,
BLAKE [33], Groestl [34], JH [35], Keccak [36], and Skein [37], were chosen in
December 2010. Finally, the Keccak algorithm, designed by Guido Bertoni, Joan
Daemen, Michael Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche, was selected as the SHA3 standard
in October 2012.
2.4 Message Authentication Code
Providing a way to check the integrity of information that is stored or transmitted
between unreliable parties is a very important need especially in communication.
This mechanism is provided by message authentication codes (MAC). A message
authentication code (MAC) is a hash function that produces a MAC value using a
key [28]. It is also called keyed hash function. The MAC algorithm can both provide
the authenticity and integrity assurance. Authenticity assurance can be gained by
sharing a secret key between parties and checking the MAC of the message for that
key. The integrity assurance comes from the hash function.
One common way to construct a MAC is to concatenate the key with the message in
an unkeyed hash function. However, there are additional security requirements for a
MAC compared to an unkeyed hash function. As an example, an attacker must not have
the ability of guessing the MAC of any other messages without performing infeasible
amounts of computation, even he has ability to generate MACs for the chosen messages
[28]. Therefore constructions and padding schemes, e.g. NMAC and HMAC, have
been designed to avoid such weaknesses [38]. Otherwise, length extension attack can
be applied to SHA1 and SHA2 and some information can be learned when the message
and the length of the key is known. Therefore, they have to be used in a padding scheme
like HMAC to build a keyed hash function. However, Keccak as SHA3 standard does
not have any length extension weakness, so a MAC algorithm can be constructed by
just prepending the key with the message [36].
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Figure 2.1: HMAC-SHA1 Construction .
2.5 Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
Keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) is a specific construction that
provides a secure mechanism to produce a MAC, in which a hash function is used
with a combination of key. HMAC construction was first published in 1996 by Mihir
Bellare, Ran Canetti, and Hugo Krawczyk and standardizied as RFC 2104 [39].
The goals of the HMAC padding scheme is explained by the writes in five substances:
(1) Provides a secure use for all working hash functions in a MAC constructed way.
(2) Preserving the performance of hash function when it is MAC constructed.
(3) Providing an easy way to handle keys.
(4) Providing a well understood proof for the strength and security of a MAC
construction for a secure hash function.
(5) Providing replaceability of the hash function of a MAC construction.
Any cryptographic hash function can be used with HMAC function like MD5
or SHA-1 and the construction will be named as HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1
respectively. The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends upon the cryptographic
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strength of the underlying hash function, the size of its hash output, and on the size and
quality of the key. Any size of key can be used but the values smaller than the hash
output size decreases the strength of the function while the longer sized keys does not
increase [39].
HMAC-SHA1 is given in Figure 2.1 as an example of the construction. The
mathematical operations of the algorithm are shown in the Equation (2.9) using the
language of standard [39]:
ipad = the byte 0x36 repeated until the one-block length is reached (0x36..36),
opad = the byte 0x5C repeated until the one-block length is reached (0x5C..5C),
"||" denotes the concatenation operation,
HMAC(text) = H(K XOR opad || H(K XOR ipad || text)) (2.9)
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3. OVERVIEW OF SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES
Software vulnerability in terms of security, types of attacks using them and
countermeasures are explained in this chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to give the
idea to the reader about the security of software and why they are vulnerable. Simple
examples are given to present how easily a software can be vulnerable, what kind of
attacks can be exploited to them. The main countermeasures to attacks are mentioned.
The main research tracks are summarized.
This chapter is written in an introduction manner and details are not given. The
methodologies in this chapter are mainly given on high end computing devices since
the research has made mostly considering them and low end devices also have similar
properties in some subjects. The active research areas and the needs for the security of
computing devices against software vulnerabilities are presented.
3.1 Attacks Using Software Vulnerabilities
Frequently, computing platforms are threatened by external attacks, which can aim
to gather sensitive information, disrupt computer operation, gain access to private
systems. In computer security these attacks have become one of the most compelling
challenges because of their combined effects [40]. Generally, they come from the
communication channel and locate some code to the program memory then occupy the
control of the system by using the low-level software vulnerabilities [40].
A software vulnerability is a bug that can be triggered by an attacker with possibly
disastrous consequences [1]. An introductory background information about such
vulnerabilities is given in this topic. Their initiation to a software system is shown
and their difficulty of elimination is discussed.
Baltopoulos and Gordon have proposed a principle called "source-based reasoning"
to provide a software low-level security [41]. The principle indicates that security
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properties of a software system should follow the review of the source code and its
source level semantics, and should not depend on details of the compiler or execution
platform [41]. This means that a programmer should only care at the source code level
and let the compiler and run-time system worry about the low-level execution platform.
Many mechanisms have been proposed for defending against these attacks [40].
However, secure high level abstraction of the platform have not been achieved in high
level programming languages [40]. Still, consequences of a bug in the software can
not be understand without considering many details of the execution platform.
Both attacking such vulnerabilities and defending against such attacks depend on low
level details of the software and the attacked computing platform. Although source
based reasoning is provided in safe languages like Java, more powerful attacks can be
made in the case that attacker can interact with the code at the machine code level. As
an example, a browser extension can attack any web page visited or a malicious kernel
module can install a root kit [40].
Attacker models are distinguished into two models, which are interactive attacker
model and in-process attacker model, in the paper [40].
The interactive attacker can interact with the program by giving input and reading
output. He uses the failures of source-based reasoning principle of the unsafe
languages such as C and C++. For examples, he can use a buffer overflow vulnerability
of a software that is designed in unsafe language such as C or C++ or exploit a logic
flaw against a program written in a safe language. This is the case of an attacker trying
to undermine a network service that is protected from a server [40].
The in-process attacker can load some machine code while the execution of the
program. For example; he can scan or change the memory for secrets, change the
control flow although the program is designed in a safe language. Applications built
from components coming from different stakeholders or the binary run time plugins of
the applications is an in-process attacker model [40].
An overview of the interactive attack model are summarized in the paper [1] and given
four selected methods of applying these attacks: 1. Corrupting the return address of
a function on the stack. 2. Corrupting function pointers stored in the heap. 3. An
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Table 3.1: Example stack area for the Algorithm 1 [1]. The attacker changes the
function return address to 0x0012ff48, which he placed an infinite loop as
seen in the Table 3.2.
address content
0x0012ff5c 0x00353037 argument second pointer
0x0012ff58 0x0035302f argument first pointer
0x0012ff54 0x00401263 return address 0x48 0xFF 0x12 ’\0’
0x0012ff50 0x61666473 saved base pointer ’s’ ’d’ ’f’ ’a’
0x0012ff4c 0x61666473 tmp continues ’s’ ’d’ ’f’ ’a’
0x0012ff48 0x61666473 tmp continues 0xCD 0x2E 0xEB 0xFE
0x0012ff44 0x612f2f3a tmp continues ’:’ ’\’ ’\’ ’a’
0x0012ff40 0x656c6966 tmp array: ’f’ ’i’ ’l’ ’e’
existing code can be executed after pointers are corrupted. 4. Control flow can be
changed via corruption of data values that determine behavior.
Algorithm 1 Example of stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability: The program flow
can be conducted by the attacker when the function returns if the strings are chosen by
the attacker [1].
int unsafe( char* first, char* second ){
// Must have strlen(first) + strlen(second) < MAX_LEN
char tmp[MAX_LEN];
// Style-1
char* b = tmp;
for( ; *first != ’\0’; ++first, ++b ) *b = *first;
for( ; *second != ’\0’; ++second, ++b ) *b = *second;
*b = ’\0’;
// Style-2
// strcpy( tmp, first );
// strcat( tmp, second );
return strcmp( tmp, "file://foobar" );
}
The function in the Algorithm 1 takes 2 string pointers, concatenate them and returns
the result of the comparison with "file://foobar". The same code can be written as the
style-2, which is commented in the Algorithm 1. Both of the codes have stack-based
buffer overflow vulnerability. If the input strings are chosen from the attacker return
address of the function can be changed and the attacker can gain the full control of the
program.
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Table 3.2: The ASM program of the attacker in the Table 3.1 [1].
Machine Code Opcode ASM instructions
0xcd 0x2e int 0x2e ; system call to the operating system
0xeb 0xfe L: jmp L ; a very short, direct infinite loop
An example interactive attack to the Algorithm 1 can be made as shown in the
Table 3.1. In the case of a regular operation of the function in the Algorithm 1,
the concatenation of two input strings would be stored to the addresses between
0x0012ff40 and 0x0012ff4c. However an attacker can overflow the reserved area and
can change the return address as he wants. In the case of Table 3.1, he changed return
address to 0x0012ff48 where he placed an infinite loop as can be understand from the
Table 3.2.
This attack is called return-address clobbering and it was widely effective a decade
ago on the codes compiled with C , C++. Blaster worm, which affected a majority
of Internet users in 2003 [42], was built using this vulnerability. Since the worm was
using loops it couldn’t be detected by the analyses tools. Although this attack is not
prominent still, this example gives the idea of software vulnerabilities and shows how
easy to have one.
A safer version of the program in the Algorithm 1 is given in the Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 More Secure design of the Algorithm 1 [1].
int safer( char* first, char* second ){
char tmp[MAX_LEN] = { ’\0’ };
strcpy_s( t, _countof(t), a );
strcat_s( t, _countof(t), b );
return strcmp( t, "abc" );
}
Two more examples given in the paper [40] for the interactive attack, are shown in here
to present other basic software vulnerabilities for the interactive attacker model.
The program in the Algorithm 3 takes the username and password from the user
and makes privileged operations if they have a correct match. Although the memory
reservation for the username variable is 24 size of char, the program allows to take 28
size of char. This error causes a buffer overflow vulnerability. Typically the compiler
will put other variables next to username. This can cause to change the result of valid
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credentials by making authenticated variable different than zero. Therefore, one can
make privileged operations by using the compiler and execution platform details.
Algorithm 3 A buffer overflow vulnerability for the interactive attacker coming from
the error of the memory reservation for the username variable.
int do_maintenance() {
int authenticated = 0;
char username [24];
char password [28];
fgets(username , sizeof(password), stdin);
fgets(password , sizeof(password), stdin);
if (valid_credentials (username, password) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
if ( authenticated )
//Do privileged operations
}
The program in the Algorithm 4 takes a string from the command line and initializes
the src buffer then transforms it with an assigned operation and writes the result to dst
buffer. Since there is no check for the src buffer a code injection attack can be realized
on this code. One can input more than 256 bytes and overflow the src and dst buffers
and change the function pointer that is assigned to capitalize function. As an example
he can direct the program to address of src after he injected his own code to it. As
seen in this example, an interactive attacker can become an in-processor attacker by
inserting an arbitrary code.
The class of bugs, which is produced because of unreferenced pointers, can be used to
put the program into an unintended execution flow. This causes a vulnerability referred
as Dangling Pointer, which can be exploited by an attacker to reallocate the memory
and launch a buffer overflow attack [43].
For these examples given in the Algorithm 1, 3, 4 although code semantics shows the
state of the program as undefined, an attacker can use vulnerabilities by relying on the
compiler and execution platform details such as layout of the variables on the memory
and Von Neumann architecture, which executes the code in the data memory.
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Algorithm 4 Attack2
struct data_node {
char src [128];
char dst [128];
int (* transform_func )( char *, char *);
};
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct data_node *n;
int i;
n = malloc(sizeof(struct data_node ));
n->transform_func = capitalize;
for(i=0; argv[1][i] != ’\0’; i++)
n->src[i] = argv[1][i];
(*n->transform_func )(n->src, n->dst);
};
More examples can be given for the in-processor attacker. A malicious plugin that
comes from an extension for the web browser. He can access to all of the stored secret
keys or passwords. Although source code semantics of these variables are private, the
code can access these by scanning the memory.
Although the problems of constructing source based reasoning is well understood for
the interactive attacker model, it is difficult and still an open problem for the in-process
attacker model [40].
3.2 An Overview of Countermeasures to Attacks
The main countermeasures to the attacks using the software vulnerabilities will be
discussed in this topic in order to show the evolution of defenses.
3.2.1 Defenses to interactive attacks
Providing source based reasoning for the program is highly studied in the literature and
there are two main countermeasures against interactive attacks [40]. One approach is
to use safe languages to design and another is to execute unsafe languages more
defensively.
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3.2.1.1 Safe languages
High level languages, e.g. Java, C#, Scala, are accepted as safe languages if they
provide very restricted access to unsafe features. This is achieved by ruling out
dangerous language features, compile-time and run-time check. However unsafe
languages like C and C++ are used widely and they are not expected disappear in a
near future, safe languages are only a partial solution to interactive attacks [44].
For instance, accessing to the out of bounds of an array is not possible in safe
languages. The code either can not be compiled for the bug in the code or a run time
error occurs for an exception causing a violation. Moreover, a dangling pointer can not
be created because of language constructions like garbage collectors.
3.2.1.2 Safer execution of unsafe languages
Many techniques have been developed to gain low-level security for the unsafe
languages. Most of them are explained in the Chapter 1. One method is to design
the program as tamper resistant with Additional Run Time Checks. In these methods,
behaviors of the execution is controlled and the program is terminated in case of any
violation. Placing some random variables called stack canaries to the stack boundaries
and checking whether they are changed as in Stack Guard [45] is one of the early
important example. Making data memory non executable to prevent code injection
attack is another approach in this context.
Another way is to use Randomization in order to make the executable code
meaningless to attacker or make the malicious code of attackers nonsense by
changing. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [46] and Instruction Set
Randomization (ISR) [47] are main methods.
Although a lot of developed cautions to interactive attacks are widely used in operating
systems they are still not cure for the vulnerabilities. A lot of attacks are realized
against the ASLR [48–50]. It is proved that the canary based systems like Stack
Guard can be bypassed [51] and non-executable stack or heap can be tricked with
return to libc attack [52] or return oriented programming [53]. As a result, there are
17
still evolved interactive attacks that can defeat known countermeasures to corrupt a
vulnerable system.
Return to libc attack is a method to exploit buffer overflow vulnerability of a system
that has a non-executable stack. This attack starts with a buffer overflow and continues
by changing address with an address of a function that is in the binary or shared library.
The shared library called "libc" provides the C runtime on UNIX style systems.
As a result, the return address is changed with one of a function in libc then correct
arguments are passed and have it executed for the attacker in return to libc attack.
Therefore stack protection is bypassed.
Return oriented programming is a method that allows an attacker to execute code
although the system security is strength with non executable memory segments and
code signing. Code signing is a security method that digitally signs executables and
scripts by calculating hash so that any corruption can be detected by the author.
In the return oriented attack, a malicious code execution can be realized by using
gadgets instead of programs that are in the stack or libc after the program control
flow is corrupted. The term gadget is used for a carefully chosen machine instruction
sequence. A gadget can start from the middle of existing instructions and different
instructions can be simulated. All the job an attacker should make is to find usable
byte sequences in the executable memory and realize return chaining to follow each
other in order to perform arbitrary operations.
To summarize, a fully functional "language" is provide in return-oriented programming
so that an attacker can use it to make a compromised machine perform any operation
desired.
3.2.2 Defenses to in-process attacks
As discussed before, the in-process attacks can load and execute machine code. The
attacks of this class are more powerful and realistic.
A countermeasure approach to this type of attacks is to monitor an untrusted code
by a trusted software, which uses some methods like software fault isolation [54] to
detect and change a malicious software, before it enters to the process. The weakness
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of these methods is that although the main program is protected from its untrusted
modules, modules are not protected from host. For instance, a plugin still can access
to secret keys protected in web browser [40].
In the past few years, several methods have been proposed based on isolated execution
of modules in order to protect modules and host from each other. The aim is to provide
a secure execution for the modules even the host is compromised. These methods
ranging from hardware-only to software-only.
As discussed in the chapter 1, these methods can be summarized as techniques based
on randomization, protected software modules and Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
In addition it is mentioned that more lightweight solutions, especially targeting low
cost embedded systems, for isolated execution are became popular in these few years.
Tiny operating systems [55–60] and small hardware additions for program-counter
based memory access control [2, 5, 7] are the most promising research lines.
3.3 Conclusion
The concept of software vulnerability and attacks to them are mentioned in this chapter.
It is told that source based reasoning is a necessary property of a software although it
doesn’t guarantee the low level security of a software. The reason is that a mallware
can change the program or inject an arbitrary code at the machine code level although
high level security primitives like being private is preserved after the compilation of
software.
Common known attack methods as corrupting the return address of a function on the
stack, corrupting function pointers stored in the heap, executing an existing code by
corrupting pointers, changing program flow by corrupting data values that determine
behavior are told. In addition, dangling pointer vulnerability, buffer overflow attack,
code injection attack, return to libc attack and return oriented programming attack are
explained.
The attacks are investigated using the methodology of two types as interactive
attacks or in-process attacks. In-process attacks can inject some arbitrary code while
interactive attacks can only give input to the system and read the output. It is told that,
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still evolved attacks that defeat the modern defending systems appear although they
are highly studied in literature. Moreover, they are still important since interactive
attacks can turn themselves to in-process attacks. The in-process attacks are more
powerful ones and countermeasures to them are highly studied in this decade around
the idea of providing strong isolation of code and data. Defending systems in the
range of software-only to hardware-only have been proposed. Systems using software
modules depending on the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) are popular recently.
In addition to their implementation on high end devices, another approaches for
embedded devices are appeared recently including tiny secure operating systems and
adding small memory access control circuits for the low level.
Since any computing device can be corrupted by an uncalculated attack, verifying the
state of a computing device is very important. Therefore realizing attestation schemes
in a secure way in order to acquire trustworthiness of a computing device is vital.
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4. REMOTE ATTESTATION AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS
Providing a secure attestation and execution for the modules even when the host is
compromised has became an important issue for the security of programs. A lot of
research have been made in this decade and some methods are proposed. The proposed
methods are mainly using tamper resistant software and isolated execution of modules
of the program ideas [40]. The computing platform and its network are considered
as the combination of the modules then secure execution environments are tried to be
produced for the protected modules.
Different methods are proposed from purely hardware based to software based
approaches mostly targeting high end devices to embedded devices [11]. Recently
some promising lightweight approaches are proposed. Although the scope of this
thesis is lightweight solutions, all methods are summarized then promising lightweight
solutions other that SMART [7] is explained in this chapter.
4.1 Software Based Systems
Tamper resistant software [61] method is proposed to detect any tampering in the
code by adding built-in integrity checks to the code. Tamper resistant software
typically calculates a checksum on its code and checks whether the checksum
corresponds with an expected value. Additional Run Time Checks and Randomization
is the main methods for tampering [40].
• Run Time Check is generally based on checking source level behaviors at the run
time and terminate the program in case of violation.
Stack Guard [45]: A randomly chosen variable, called as canary, is added on the
stack boundaries, before the return address, of the function and checked after the
execution of the body of the program. Catching a modified canary means a buffer
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overflow therefore the program is terminated. This work is important because of
the introduction of stack canary.
There are a lot of proposals in literature that extends the stack canary concept by
adding new features to gain increased security for the stack, local variables and
heap. Different versions are still in use for operating systems [40, 62].
Another approach is to make the data memory non executable with additional run
time checks. This is generally provided by today’s operating systems.
• Obfuscation (techniques based on randomization) [63–65] is the process of
randomizing the binary executable that makes difficult to understand and change
the code even at the machine code level. Full abstractions can be provided at the
low level machine code. The data layout or the instruction set can be randomized
in order to make the attacker’s code meaningless.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [46]: The stack, heap and libraries
of a process are loaded to different memory spaces. Therefore even the program is
corrupted from an attacker, he is prevented to use the variables of the program and
jump to malicious code since he doesn’t know the application addresses. This is
implemented in almost all operating systems.
Abadi and Plotkin [66] proposed an approach to keep abstraction for the low level
by storing a random number to each location. While the confidentiality is provided
in high level code by simply protecting the location of variables, it is preserved at
the low level by mapping private locations to random level addresses.
Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) [47]: Each process is attached with different
instruction set in order to make injected code meaningless. Point Guard uses
encryption for the random function. Therefore even an attacker changes a pointer,
the decryption of the changed data would be something absurd for his aim [67].
There are applications using the same principle by randomizing the address space
of memory [68] or the interface of the operating system [69]. However, these
methods seems to be rough models for the real execution platforms [40]. Moreover,
obfuscation makes the reverse engineering process more time consuming but not
impossible [70, 71, 71, 72].
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• White-box cryptography, in which the keys are hide into applications, is another
method for tamper resistant software. Chow et al. [73] proposed to hide the key in
executable code while Michiels and Gorissen hide in a large collection of lookup
tables [74]. The key will be changed if the code is altered.
However, when these software techniques are used to protect standalone,
non-networked applications, their security is limited. Most proposals for a
white-box block cipher have been broken [70, 71, 71, 72].
Networked schemes for the design of tamper resistant software are more powerful
since the comparison of integrity checksum doesn’t have to be inside the software
and it can be performed remotely. Moreover, runtime can be controlled to check if
additional processes are executed.
• Code Replacement [75] is proposed by Ceccato et al as a modified approach
suggesting to change the client application periodically with a new version using
a new key or obfuscated.
Although the comparison of the checksum in the remote attestation platform can
be performed in a trusted manner by a remote service provider, the integrity of
the platform becomes the main problem. For example, an attacker can send the
result of the uncorrupted platform instead of the targeted one in the scenario that
the adversary has complete control. Moreover, the platform can be corrupted just
after it is attested.
Kennell and Jamieson [76] proposed genuinity tests for the verifier to check
whether the program is running on the targeted system e.g. specific hardware,
operating system or virtual machine. In addition to being slow, they are also cracked
by Shankar et al. [77].
• First SWATT [20] then Pioneer [21, 78] are proposed by Seshadri et al. for
the software based remote attestation for embedded devices and high-end devices
relatively. In these schemes, run time of the attestation is checked by the verifier.
The idea is that modifying, executing an arbitrary code or redirection of the network
flow gets extra overhead to the system and this can be detected by checking the run
time of the attestation code when the checksum is requested.
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• Software Splitting is an alternative solution proposed by Zhang and Gupta [79]
in order to protect software security. Small and essential parts of an application
are removed from untrusted platform and they are stored to a secure server or a
coprocessor.
In the past few years, several methods have been proposed based on isolated execution
of modules in order to protect software partitions and host from each other. The aim
is to provide a secure execution for the modules even the host is compromised. These
methods ranging from hardware-only to software-only.
• The Multics operating System [80] was a long term system modern operating
system project introducing the security concepts. Protection rings idea is introduced
for hierarchical layering in order to isolate less trusted programs. However, it is still
being attack successfully despite many improvements and research.
• On-board Credentials Project [81] is another example of isolated execution that
doesn’t need additional hardware. A specific key is produced from a master key
for each module to provide secure communication between different modules.
Moreover, only one program is loaded effectively for any single moment.
4.2 Hardware Based Systems
An early example of a hardware-based mechanism is Secure Boot [2], which verifies
system integrity at boot time. The root of trust is an immutable bootloader stored in
ROM along with a public key. It verifies code signature and executes the code (i.e.,
boot) only if the signature is valid, thus authenticating code origin and integrity.
4.2.1 Secure co-processor
A Secure coprocessor is an hardware module, which includes CPU, bootstrap ROM,
and secure non-volatile memory, that can be trusted to execute their software correctly
despite attacks [82]. Sensitive information, e.g. cryptographic keys, can be stored
in a secure way and the critical memory is erased in case of penetration, even for
hardware attacks . Similarly, their encryption systems are assumed to be resistant
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to crptoanalysis. Providing guarantees about the privacy and integrity of the secure
non-volatile memory of secure coprocessors support basis for distributed security
systems [83].
A secure communication channel to untrusted platform can be established over
a network using secure coprocessors with proper cryptographic techniques [11].
Moreover this channel can be used for a remote attestation scheme where integrity
can be verified or a software update mechanism.
The FIPS 140-2 standard [84] for cryptographic modules includes specifications for
secure coprocessors and four security levels are defined according their strengths.
There are highest graded coprocessors in the market, e.g. IBM 4764.
Secure coprocessors mostly used in applications that processes sensitive information
like electronic commerce applications and banking applications. Electronic contracts,
electronic currency copy protection and secure postage meters can be given as
examples [82]. Latest smart card designs can also be shown another example. They
includes coprocessors that are constrained with power and storage capacity.
4.2.2 Trusted computing and trusted platform module (TPM)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a dedicated hardware [85], like coprocessor, that
is optimized to provide security and safeguard private and secret data. It can securely
store cryptographic primitives, including passwords, certificates and encryption keys,
that is used to authenticate the platform. In addition platform measurements can be
stored for the measurement of assurance of the computing platform.
The first TPM were developed by the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA),
including HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft etc. in 1999. Then TCPA was suspended
and a new group called the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is announced
with membership of 14 companies including AMD, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel
Corporation, Microsoft, Sony Corporation and Sun Microsystems in 2003.
They define themselves as a non-for-profit organization formed to develop, define
and promote open, vendor-neutral, global industry standards, supportive of a
hardware-based root of trust, for interoperable trusted computing platforms [85]. TCG
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Figure 4.1: Components of Trusted Platform Module.
adopted the TCPA specifications and shifted their focus to expansion of the use of the
specification and maintaining its further development. Open industry specifications are
published for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) security chip by TCG.
Authentication and attestation are necessary for safer computing in all environments
and TPM chips helps to provide these properties [86]. It is guaranteed that the platform
can prove that it works as it is claimed via authentication while the trustworthiness of
the platform is checked using attestation. The components of the TPM specification
is shown in the Figure 4.1. The components can be classified as three parts that are
for secure storage, execution and security artifacts. TPM is communicates with the
central microprocessor using the Low Pin Count (LPC) bus, which is standardized
interface. Also there are some manufacturers communicating with embedded systems
using Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) or System Management Bus (SMBus) interface.
One of the main structure of the TPMs are configuration registers (PCRs). PCRs keep
the state of the system. They are only accessible only via a fixed API and they are only
reset on boot. PCRs are updated after a module is called with the concatenation of the
old values and the cryptographic hash value of the software. A comparison is made
between current measurement and corresponding expected value. System is halted in
case of any violation. As a result integrity of the system can be controlled using PCRs
and a root of trust for measurement (RTM) can be established. The integrity of the
system, including TPM itself, BIOS, OS etc., is checked in each boot.
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PCRnew = H(PCRold||M) (4.1)
Although TPM firstly thought a solution for all computing platforms it is seen that
different platforms can have different security requirements especially embedded
devices and mobile phones. As a result Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) is published by
trusted computing mobile phone group (MPWG). Defining a subset of TPM commands
are defined as mobile specific and distinguishing local and remote owner of the
platform are main differences.
4.3 Software Systems Using Hardware
Hardware based cryptography is considered stronger than software based schemes
against external software attacks. They have a lot of applications such as digital
signing, mission critical applications, secure email or secure document management
where greater level of security is needed. It is hard to access information in a hardware
protected computing platform without proper authorization. The sensitive information
and functionality can be sealed in case of violation.
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is developed to provide isolation of software modules
with the help of additional hardware. However, It is important to remember that TPM
can not control the software in the device. Pre-run time configuration parameters
can be stored in TPM but beyond that it is the other applications duty to determine
and implement policy of using TPM. Therefore systems are developed that uses the
TPM that provides isolated secure execution for modules in order to protect them from
attacks. Flicker [87], TrustVisor [88] and SICE [89] are important designs in this
content.
Flicker [87] uses a chip called Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for high end devices.
Operating system and Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) are excluded and The central
processing unit (CPU) is set into a known safe state before a module is executed.
This is called late lunch. The allocated memory for the module is cleared after it is
terminated and the execution of the application is resumed. PCRs are updated after a
module is called. Moreover, sensitive information is stored or shared between modules
by specifying PCRs for them.
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TrustVisor changed late lunch sequence with virtual machine extension to check the
unviolated execution of the module. Although Flicker only uses 250 lines of code, it
has significant performance overhead to the system. The performance is improved in
TrustVisor and SICE.
SICE [89] is a novel framework to provide hardware-level isolation and protection for
sensitive workloads running on x86 platforms in compute clouds. The security of the
isolated environments is guaranteed by a trusted computing base that only includes the
hardware, the BIOS, and the System Management Mode (SMM). System management
module (SMM) ensures that the software enters a known state instead of late lunch of
Flicker.A module can be started after a management interrupt is requested (SMI) and
an isolated execution environment is prepared before the module is executed in this
scheme.
4.4 Lightweight Solutions
Recently, more lightweight solutions for isolated execution are proposed with tiny
operating systems [55–60] or small hardware additions [2, 5, 7] to control memory
access.
Software based attestation algorithms uses a checksum function that is placed in the
prover. The prover calculates the state of the software in the platform and sends it to
the verifier. The software state is generally calculated by using a cryptographic hash
function on the execution elements like the program code. Then verifier checks the
checksum. In addition, checking the execution time is proposed by the SWATT [20]
team. Validating the checksum means that the challenger has the expected software.
Checking that the execution is finished in a specific time frame proves that no extra
overhead has been created, which means that the checksum is calculated honestly by
the platform. Note that the term prover, which can also be used as challanger, is used
for the platform that need to be attested while the verifier represents the platform that
verifies the prover.
However, strong assumptions must be made in order to make the software based
attestations secure. Firstly, they are vulnerable to network attacks such as
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impersonation or collusion with other devices [5]. This means that the prover should be
linked directly to the verifier without using a network. In addition, they are vulnerable
to hardware attacks like overclocking or increasing the memory of the processor [5].
4.4.1 PUF based system of Schulz et al.
Schulz et al. [5] constructed a lightweight solution that combines software-based
attestation with a PUF. Schulz et al. [5] discusses that a software based system can
be secure if the checksum calculation is linked to challenger’s platform. One approach
is to include hardware specific side effects, e.g. CPU states, caching effects to the
checksum function [76] in order to prevent an adversary to simulate the attestation
process. Unfortunately, it is shown that these properties are not strong enough to define
the individual hardware platform instead only groups of devices can be distinct [77,90].
Schulz et al. [5] proposes using Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) instead of
hardware specific side effects. Software based attestation scheme is modified by
integrating device specific hardware properties in this way. The scheme is claimed
to be secure against collusion of challengers meaning that the attestation can’t be
simulated by a fake challenger. Therefore authentication and attestation of remote
challengers can be securely supported. In addition, the hardware attacks can be
detected by the challenger.
The scheme needs PUFs that are designed to behave deterministic and have the
following properties [5], more detail can be found in [91]:
• Robustness: PUF always returns the same output y for the same input x.
• Independence: There is no collusion between the outputs for the same input of any
two different PUFs. The output y of PUF must be different with the output y’ of
PUF’ for the same input x.
• Pseudo-randomness: PUF should show the characteristic of a pseudo-random
function and it is unfeasible to break.
• Tamper evidence: PUF irreversibly changes in case of any attempt of physical
access.
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Figure 1: Remote attestation based on physical functions
lying software attestation scheme. P then iteratively com-
putes  k by taking i random measurement samples out of S.
Specifically, in each iteration i of the checksum computation
P invokes three procedures: GenMemAddr(), SwSum(), and
HwSum(). GenMemAddr(ri 1, yi) is used to generate an out-
put ri and a memory address ai, which determines the next
memory block S[ai] of S to be included into the software
checksum as  i  SwSum( i 1, S[ai]). Note that SwSum()
is the same function as in plain software attestation, while
we require only a minor modification of GenMemAddr() to in-
clude the hardware checksum output yi. Typically, modern
software attestation schemes implement GenMemAddr() as a
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) to prevent ef-
ficient pre-computation or memory mappings attacks. How-
ever, neither the PRNG nor the SwSum() are required to be
cryptographically strong [20]. Hence, it is usually straight-
forward to integrate yi into GenMemAddr() by using it as an
additional seed to the PRNG.
In contrast to plain software attestation, our attestation
scheme integrates a hardware checksum HwSum() into each
iteration i, yielding the previously mentioned additional in-
put yi  HwSum( i) to the GenMemAddr() procedure. As a
result, every iteration of the software checksum additionally
depends on the result of the device-characteristic hardware
checksum, thus binding the attestation response  k to the
prover’s hardware. Similarly, each iteration of HwSum() de-
pends on the previous intermediate software checksum  i 1,
s.t. HwSum() cannot be executed independently of SwSum().
However, we emphasize that the depicted algorithm can be
optimized to execute HwSum() and SwSum() in parallel in all
but the very first iteration.
After every memory block S[ai] has been included into
the checksum at least once, P sends  k to V. While waiting
for the response of P, V can compute a reference checksum
 0k by simulating the computation of P using the known
trusted software state SI recorded in database D and em-
ulate HwSum() using EmulateHwSum() with some verification
data CI , which is secret information only available to V. V
accepts only if (1) P replied within a certain time frame
 I and (2)  k matches  
0
k. The first check ensures that P
computed  k in about the same time  I an honest device
would have needed and has not performed additional com-
putations, e.g., to hide the presence of malware. The second
check verifies whether the software state S measured by P
corresponds to the known trusted software state SI . If ei-
ther of these checks fails, P is assumed to be in an unknown
software state and is rejected.
Note that the verification of the PUF-based hardware
checksum by V is not straightforward: V must be able to
predict the outputs of the PUF, while this must be infeasi-
ble for A. This is further complicated by the large amount
of hardware checksum responses required by our construc-
tion and the closely parallelized execution of software and
hardware checksum. Hence, the integration of PUFs into
software attestation requires careful consideration and we
discuss possible instantiations in Section 4
Security objectives.
In contrast to existing software attestation schemes, our
PUF-based attestation scheme additionally achieves the fol-
lowing security goals:
• Correctness: A prover in a known trusted state must
always be accepted by the verifier.
• Unforgeability: A prover in an unknown state must be
rejected by the verifier. Note that this also includes
attacks, where the adversary makes the sensor node to
collude with more powerful devices to forge the attes-
tation.
• Prover authentication: A prover pretending to be an-
other prover must be rejected by the verifier.
• Prover isolation: A prover colluding with other (mali-
cious) provers must be rejected by the verifier.
• Tamper-evidence: A prover that is not in its original
hardware state must be rejected by the verifier.
4. INSTANTIATION
In this section, we show how existing software attesta-
tion schemes can be used to instantiate software checksum
SwSum() and the memory address generator GenMemAddr()
with only minor modifications. Moreover, we discuss di↵er-
ent instantiations of the hardware checksum HwSum() and,
in particular, the corresponding secret verification data CI
and EmulateHwSum() algorithm.
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Figure 4.2: PUF Based Attestation Scheme in the Paper [5].
The scheme of the PUF based software attestation is given in the figure 4.2. The
cheksum and the execution time is verified as in the software based attestation schemes.
The only difference from software based attestation schemes is HwSum() function,
which is generally a cryptographic HMAC function. HwSum() function calculates a
hardware checksum using the PUF that is integr ted to t e platform. As a result the
soft are based attestation scheme is bind to t e resp ctive hardware platform in rder
to provide secur remote attestation.
Verifying the execution time guarantees that no extra operation like malicious
ex cution has been made by the remote computing platform. Hardware attacks like
acces ing a fast r interface between the CPU and HwSum() or performance increase
of HwSum() function will be detected by the tamper eviden PUF. In addition PUF is
unclonable and platform specific. For these reasons he integ ity is assured.
Although ev ryth ng eems very clear, PUF based software attestation has some design
complex ties. T verifier should k ow the responses of the platform specific PUF
before any challenge is given while this must be unfeasible for the adversary to
be secure. Schulz et al. [5] discusses two solutions for this challenge: (1) Using
emulatable PUF, whose responses can be set up a mathematical model for the
unknown challenges [92, 93]. (2) Creating a database D of the Challange Response
Pairs (CRP) sets before challenger’s platform is deployed. However, simulating all
CRP elements must be unfeasible for an adversary therefore the database needs to
be very large. Since producing a big database and searching for the elements of each
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iteration step, shown in the figure 4.2, is cost expensive. Two approaches are suggested
to reduce the database. (a) Instead of saving intermediate results of the iteration, shown
as σi in the challenger part of the figure 4.2, only the responses derived from a random
offset q can be produced. Then a subsets of the database D can be created depending on
offset q, challenge r. (b) Creating a mutually authenticated and confidential channel
between the challenger and the verifier. The verifier can send two random offset q
instead of one at the start of attestation. Then challenger can produce an additional
subset depending on the second random offset q. As a result the subset database can be
updated after each successful attestation. However this will create an additional load
for the communication channel
There is no published implementation for the PUF based software attestation system
proposed by Schulz et al. [5]. Implementing a PUF hardware that gives same responses
for each inputs is not an easy task. Moreover, producing a database of challenge
response database or setting a PUF to to a mathematical model needs extra effort. In
addition, security of the scheme is based on the challenge response sequences, which
are only known by the verifier. Although this system is shown as promising [11], its
implementation is hard and it has certain shortcomings.
4.4.2 Self protecting modules of Strackx et. al.
Strackx et al. [2] proposed a lightweight method called self-protecting modules (SPM)
in order to gain isolation for subsystems of same processor and memory space. The
SPM architecture needs simple hardware changes to the system while these changes
provides strong assurance for the secrecy of the keys. Software is used to gain
cryptographic capabilities.
SPM is a structured area of memory having three memory sections, which are SSecret,
SPublic and SEntry as seen in the Figure 4.3. SSecret section keeps the sensitive
information such as cryptographic keys, which should be prevented from access of
an attacker. SPublic section is non-executable and includes non-secret memory area
such as regular program code or data that can leak. All of the memory sections can
only be entered from specified entry points that are stored in the SEntry section. In
addition, rights of accessibility of memory sections are restricted depending on the
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(a) Initialization
(b) Destruction
Fig. 1. The life of an SPM from initialization (1a) to destruction (1b)
will authenticate the identity of the newly loaded SPM and then provision it
with its initial secret data.
Of course, the question then remains how the vault itself gets initialized.
For that, we trust (a part of) the boot process: the vault gets installed and
provisioned with secret data at boot time, and is never unloaded.
Once SPM’s are loaded and initialized, they can securely call functionality of
other SPM’s. That is: an SPM can call an entry point of another SPM with the
following guarantees: (1) it is calling into an SPM with the correct identity, and
(2) the integrity and confidentiality of parameters and return values is protected.
Destruction of an SPM is similar to initialization. Fig. 1b displays the steps
graphically. First, the vault is used to store secret data securely on untrusted
storage. In step two, the secret data is overwritten. Finally, access control on the
SPM is disabled and the SPM becomes unprotected memory again.
We now discuss several aspects of this design in more detail.
3.2 Layout of an SPM
An SPM is structured in three memory areas or sections (see Fig. 2) with diﬀerent
access control settings. Table 1 gives a schematic overview and should be read as
Figure 4.3: Initialization of Self Protecting Module (SPM) [2].
Table 4.1: Memory access control matrix of Self Protecting Module (SPM) [2].
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Fig. 2. The layout of an SPM in memory
Table 1. The memory access control matrix
from\to SEntry SPublic SSecret unprotected
SEntry x
SPublic rx rx rw rwx
SSecret
Unprotected/other SPM rx r rwx
3.3 Hardware Modifications
In order to use the proposed solution, some hardware modifications are required.
Besides the access control model, three instructions need to be supported.
setProtected. Installation of an SPM starts with loading the co tent of its sec-
tions into memory. Up to this point this content is not protected but any
modification will be detected later on. Only after successful execution of the
setProtected instruction with the correct parameters, access control is enabled
and the SPM is protected from hostile code stored at any location outside the
SPM, running at any privilege level.
To simplify checks executed before protection is enabled, the setProtected
instruction assumes a fixed ordering f the SPM’s sections in m mory. The SEn-
try section is always placed at the ower memory l cations immediately followed
by the SPublic and SS cret sections, re pectively. Using this fixed layout, the
instruction only requires 4 arguments; start spm, size sentry, size spublic
and size ssecret (see Fig. 2). The first argument, start spm, provides the
address of the lowest memory location that will be protected, the base of the
SEntry section. The other arguments provide the length of each section as they
are placed in memory.
current address of PC. The memory access control matrix of SPM is given in the Table
4.1. For instance, SPublic section can’t be executed from outside of the SPM memory
region and can only be executed from SEntry or SPublic sections.
One of the important contribution of this work is the program counter (PC) based
memory access control model. An addi ional hardware reads the PC and its previous
value in order to restrict the memory accesses and rights to read, write or execute
operations.
The creation of an SPM has 3 steps as shown in the Figure 4.3. First, SPublic and
SEn ry sections are load to memory. Second, boundari s of the SPM a e defined,
memory access control protection is enabled and secret section is initialized with zeros.
The created SPM can be authenticated and any corruption in the step 1 can b detect d
after the second step. SSecret section can be loaded if the created SPM is correctly
authenticated by another trusted SPM called vault. Likewise destruction of an SPM
has a similar protocol. Extensibility is supported using a trust chain like procedure
after first SPM is loaded at boot time.
The isolation of modules and secure interaction is protected and provided with similar
protocols by taking advantage of SPM structure. It is forced that an SPM can be called
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that its modules run untampered. This kind of secure
software extensibility is very useful for applications of
sensor networks, for instance in the logistics and medical
domains. We discuss some application areas in more
detail in Section 2.4.
The main distinguishing feature of our approach is that
we achieve these security guarantees without any soft-
ware in the TCB on the device, and with only minimal
hardware extensions. Our attacker model assumes that an
attacker has complete control over the software state of
a device, and even for such attackers our security archi-
tecture ensures that any results a party receives from one
of its modules can be validated to be genuine. Obviously,
with such a strong attacker model, we can not guarantee
availability, so an attacker can bring the system down, but
if results are received their integrity and authenticity can
be verified.
More specifically, we make the following contribu-
tions:
• We propose Sancus1, a security architecture for
resource-constrained, extensible networked embed-
ded systems, that can provide remote attestation and
strong integrity and authenticity guarantees with a
minimal (hardware) TCB.
• We implement the hardware required for Sancus as
an extension of a mainstream microprocessor, and
we show that the cost of these hardware changes (in
terms of performance, area and power) is small.
• We implement a C compiler that targets Sancus-
enabled devices. Building software modules for San-
cus can be done by putting some simple annotations
on standard C files, showing that the cost in terms of
software development is also low.
To guarantee the reproducibility and verifiability of our
results, all our research materials, including the hardware
design of the processor, and the C compiler are publicly
available.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
First, in Section 2 we clarify the problem we address by
defining our system model, attacker model and the secu-
rity properties we aim for. The next two sections detail
the design of Sancus and some interesting implementation
aspects. Section 5 reports on our evaluation of Sancus and
the final two sections discuss related work and conclude.
2 Problem statement
2.1 System model
We consider a setting where a single infrastructure
provider, IP, owns and administers a (potentially large)
1Sancus was the ancient Roman god of trust, honesty and oaths.
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Figure 1: Overview of our system model. IP provides a
number of nodes Ni on which software providers SPj can
deploy software modules SMj,k.
set of microprocessor-based systems that we refer to as
nodes Ni. A variety of third-party software providers SP j
are interested in using the infrastructure provided by IP.
They do so by deploying software modules SMj,k on the
nodes administered by IP. Figure 1 provides an overview.
This abstract setting is an adequate model for many ICT
systems today, and the nodes in such systems can range
from high-performance servers (for instance in a cloud
system), over smart cards (for instance in GlobalPlatform-
based systems) to tiny microprocessors (for instance in
sensor networks). In this paper, we focus on the low
end of this spectrum, where nodes contain only a small
embedded processor.
Any system that supports extensibility (through instal-
lation of software modules) by several software providers
must implement measures to make sure that the different
modules can not interfere with each other in undesired
ways (either because of bugs in the software, or because
of malice). For high- to mid-end systems, this problem is
relatively well-understood and good solutions exist. Two
important classes of solutions are (1) the use of virtual
memory, where each software module gets its own virtual
address space, and where an operating system or hyper-
visor implements and guards communication channels
between them (for instance shared memory sections or
inter-process communication channels), and (2) the use of
a memory-safe virtual machine (for instance a Java VM)
where software modules are deployed in memory-safe
bytecode and a security architecture in the VM guards the
interactions between them.
For low-end systems with cheap microprocessors, pro-
viding adequate security measures for the setting sketched
Figure 4.4: The IP infrastructure of Sancus [6]. N_i: sef of microprocessors
administrated by IP, SP_j: set of software providers, SM_ j,k:software
modules
from another only from an entry point if the connected SPM has a correct identity.
Moreover, integrity and confidentiality of parameters and return values of SPM is
protected.
More detailed information of the scheme can be f und in the paper [2]. No
implementation example of th schem is presented in the literature. However, the
idea of creating isolated modules using a lightw ight progr m counter based hardware
have been considered as very powerful and pr misi g [6,7,10,11]. Moreover, different
architectures using the same idea ave been proposed, e.g. El Defrawy et al. SMART
[7], Noorman et al. Sancus [6], Avonds t al. Sal s [94].
4.4.3 Sa cus of Noorman et al.
Sancus [6] is proposed by Noorman et al. as an architecture that provides isolation
and extensiblity without need of any trusted computi g base TCB software. The
scheme uses the idea of PC based emory access control and only needs very minimal
hardware additions. Sancus h s an infr structure call d IP, which contains set of
microprocessors that are represented as nodes N_i. SP_j represents third-party software
providers, which deploys softw re modul s SM_j,k to nodes administrated by IP.
As can be seen in the Figure 4.4, the scheme provides execution of software modules of
different stakeholders on the same node of the network. In addition, strong assurance
of untampered execution is provided for each party so that their modules can be run
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untampered. These properties of the scheme bring secure extensibility for third-party
software over a network of low-end processors.
Preventing different modules to interfere in undesired way is crucial for a system
to support extensibility. Many solutions are proposed to this problem for high end
devices in the literature. They are classified in two topics by Noorman et. al. [6]: (1)
Using virtual memory to get a specific memory space for each module and to control
memory usage by the help of the operating system or an hypervisor. (2) Using memory
safe virtual machine to store program modules in a memory safe space and guard the
interactions of modules. However, these solutions are expensive for low cost embedded
devices. It is discussed by Noorman et. al. [6] that the presence of a sizable trusted
software layer is a common point for all of the proposed solutions.
Software modules in the Sancus has different sections, text section and protected
sections are essential parts, as the isolated memory model shown in the Figure 4.3.
Moreover, each software modules have their own identity. Each module uses three
different key mechanisms: (1) Node N and an IP shares a master key (2) A software
provider SP and a node N shares software providers key (3) A node N and a software
module SM shares software module key and hardware forces this key to be only used by
SM. Finally, a PC based hardware circuit checks accesses to memory sections, which
is similar to the system proposed by Strackx et. al. [2].
As a result software module isolation, remote attestation, secure communication and
secure linking is achieved in the Sancus. A TCB mechanism is supported with a
minimal hardware without need of software. An implementation on MSP430 and a
compiler that produces appropriate code is provided. Additional hardware doesn’t
need too many changes in the architecture of the processor and doesn’t cost too much
therefore the scheme can be applied to different platforms easily.
4.5 Conclusion
Countermeasures against software vulnerabilities are summarized in this chapter. Then
lightweight solutions are presented as related work. Smart scheme will be explained
in detail in the chapter 5. It can be seen partitioning the computing device and its
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network as modules then providing isolated execution environment is a powerful idea
to build remote attestation and safe execution. Moreover, using an additional PC based
memory accesses control circuit is a powerful and lightweight idea to support isolated
modules.
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5. SMART: SECURE AND MINIMAL ARCHITECTURE FOR ROOT OF
TRUST
In this chapter, the SMART architecture [7], which is proposed to provide a dynamic
root of trust for low-end embedded devices, and its security considerations are
investigated theoretically. First security treatment of the system and then generic
implementation models are discussed.
5.1 Structure of the SMART
Design philosophy and security considerations of the SMART is discussed in this topic.
There is no formal security proof or a standard that is published for these hardware
software based approaches targeting the low power embedded devices at the time of
this work is written. Therefore these lightweight attestation architectures can only be
claimed to be secure with certain design considerations against known attack schemes.
A systematic security treatment of remote attestation protocol to produce a minimum
set for lightweight root of trust is presented by Francillon et. al. [95].
5.1.1 Security considerations
The Remote attestation protocol that is used in the SMART scheme is shown in Figure
5.1. Prover can be an untrusted embedded system, Verifier is the authority that gives
assurance and they are connected over a network. It is assumed that a secure algorithm,
e.g. HMAC, calculates a cryptographic checksum of prover’s state using a key and
random number nonce when the challenger requests. The key is necessary to prevent
fake replies and nonce is necessary for freshness. The challenger also knows the
expected checksum and verifies the prover after the checksum is controlled.
Certain assumptions have been made about the adversary in the SMART scheme [7].
The adversary can have a complete control over the system before and after attestation
execution. He can control and change the software, code and data of the prover and
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(1) Generate nonce n 
(2) Execute attestation code (RC) 
C = SMART(n, a, b, x, xFlag, out, in) 
 If xFlag == True then 
               Exec(x) 
(3) If C is correct then 
          Verify 
      else 
          Reject 
 
Input parameters 
C (Che
cksum)
 
Figure 5.1: The attestation scheme at the SMART [7].
he can control the communication channel any time. However, the adversary can not
perform hardware attacks on the prover, e.g. changing SMART code in ROM, learning
the key using side channel attacks [7]. It is also assumed that the Prover and the Verifier
shared a secret key, which can be loaded at production time or later in a secure way.
The Prover is a low-end embedded device that has been modified to have the following
characteristics in the SMART scheme [95]:
• It has single memory space. There should be no separation between "kernel" and
"user" memory.
• It has single thread of execution, with the exception of interrupts. It means that
the device should not offer Direct Memory Access (DMA) or that DMA can be
securely disabled during attestation.
• It has the ability to disable interrupts and force a region of code to execute
atomically.
• It has a read-only memory (ROM).
• It has the ability to clean up memory upon device reset.
• It has a hardware-based control mechanism to prevent unauthorized access to
certain memory locations.
From the definition, remote attestation must satisfy the following two properties to
protect following two attack scenarios respectively [95]:
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• Attack scenario 1: The adversary simulates the attestation.
• Attack scenario 2: The adversary can corrupt attestation of the state for an incorrect
calculation of checksum.
• Property of Attestation 1: Only the attest can compute a valid checksum. This can
be done by giving the only access of the correct key to the attest.
• Property of Attestation 2: Attestation checksum results must be different for
different states s1,s2:
Attest(s1,k) 6= Attest(s2,k), s1 6= s2. (5.1)
Three security objectives are summarized by the SMART team in order to protect the
system from the attestation properties against these attack scenarios:
Security Objectives:
• Prover Authentication: Authentication of the Prover by the Verifier.
• External verification: Guaranteeing the Verifier that the Prover has the
expected content for the questioned segment [a, b].
• Guaranteed execution: Assuring the Verifier that the Prover executed the
expected code location x.
5.1.2 Design elements
The main goal of SMART is to realize the found necessary security objectives with
minimal hardware changes. This is done with a piece of code and architectural changes
to the platform that provides a set of features, which are discussed as necessary and
sufficient by Francillon et. al. [95].
• Exclusive access to key: Attestation must have exclusive access to key. A
privileged mode can be used if the processor supports multiple privileged modes
and separation of memory for each process. Since low-end embedded devices
generally do not have this feature, adding a piece of hardware enforces the key to
be accessible only from the attestation region by checking the PC and the address
bus [7].
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• No Leaks: Attest must not leak any information related to the key except the result.
Any intermediate values should be erased after the attestation to prevent leaking [7].
• Immutability: The attestation code must be immutable to prevent the adversary
from changing the code to learn the key. In order to protect the attestation code, it
is placed into a ROM [7].
• Uninterruptibility: The adversary can change the place of malware during
attestation to hide it from detection. Attestation must run from the start to end
without interrupted. This can be done by disabling the interrupts at the beginning
of the code for single threaded execution [7].
• Invocation from start: The adversary can make attestation interruptable by invoking
the code from anywhere or he can check the sanity checks on input parameters.
Therefore the attestation code must be forced to run from the start [7].
Both uninterruptibility and invocation from start properties together provide atomic
execution that mostly protects from scenario 2 attacks. Exclusive access, no leaks
and immutability are necessary properties to prevent scenario 1 attacks. Using the
following four main building blocks for the Prover, SMART architecture can be
realized on the low cost embedded devices [7].
Building blocks of the SMART:
• Attestation Read-Only Memory: Attestation code in ROM. Key only
accessible from here.
• Secure Key Storage: Memory region inside CPU to store key.
• MCU Access Controls: Custom hardware to control exclusive access to
key and atomic execution.
• Secure Reset And Memory Erasure: Secure reset mechanism with reliable
and secure memory erasure
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Figure 5.2: Memory Architecture Overview of the SMART.
5.2 Architecture Design of the SMART
Special hardware features of the Prover are used in the SMART architecture. An
example architecture for SMART scheme is shown in the Figure 5.2. The attestation
code, which is called as SMART ROM code (RC), is put in an additional ROM that
is placed in the program address space. The key is put in an additional memory that
is placed in the data address space. The access to key memory is controlled by a
special hardware and the key is protected from software to be changed. A secure load
mechanism can be placed for key memory or a static key can be hard coded to chip.
The additional memory controller hardware has two takes Program Counter (PC) and
data address as inputs and controls memory accesses. Its main job can be summarized
to two objectives: (1) Forcing key accesses to be exclusive for the RC code (2) Forcing
that RC code can only be invoke from the start and can only be executed atomically.
In order to gain atomic execution capability for the RC code by checking the PC,
hardware should make the memory access controls as shown in the Algorithm 5.
Additional hardware trigger the internal reset flag in case of any violation.
Algorithm 5 The Atomic Execution Controls
• If the PC is in the RC but differs from the start of the RC, then the previous
instruction must also be in the RC.
• If the PC is outside of the RC, then the previous instruction must be outside of the
RC, except for the last instruction of the RC.
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The attestation program (RC algorithm) pseudo code is presented in the Algorithm
6. A Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [38] or public key digital
signature algorithm can be used for the checksum calculation. Attestation starts after
Verifier sends input parameters to the prover. Then, RC computes a checksum using
random number nonce over the memory region [a, b] of prover’s memory. The random
number must have sufficient bit length to keep the result unique enough for each
request. Fresh and secure checksum calculation yields prover authentication. Next,
RC passes control to the function placed at the address x if the xflag is set. Otherwise
user program is returned after interrupts are restored. This yields guaranteed execution
[7].
Algorithm 6 SMART Attestation Algorithm in ROM (RC Code)
input: a, b: start/end addresses for attestation
x: address to jump to after attestation
xflag: decision flag to jump x address after attestation
n: nonce number sent by the verifier
out: output address to store checksum
in: (optional) input parameter for the function at the x address
output: C: checksum
body:
1) Disable interrupts
2) Check validity of the out address and stack pointer
3) Check validity of the x address
4) Compute the checksum C, using HMAC of range [a, b] and nonce
5) Clean all temporary variables from memory
6) Write the checksum to the output address
7) if xflag== 1 then // Check if x flag is set
// Set Jump address to the function at the x with its input in
Prepare Jump (x,in);
else
Restore interrupts;
end
8) Return to targeted address // Jump to x or upper function.
There are some certain rules that a designer have to be careful about in the architecture
design, which are mainly discussed by Francillon et. al. [95]:
A denial of service (DOS) attack can be realized by setting the termination point of
the attestation to the RC code. An infinite loop can be targeted by an adversary if the
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function x is set to the last instruction of attestation code. Since PC never leave RC, no
violation will be detected. Although verifier is assured, the program of prover never
executes. In addition, SMART can be invoked partially by addressing x to somewhere
in the RC code [95]. Since the program counter never leaves from the RC region the
attestation can be compromised without any violation. Therefore, termination point x
must be controlled at the start of attestation code. This control is added as 3rd step,
which is not shown in the SMART paper [7].
Output address, stack pointer must be controlled at the start of the algorithm to avoid
vulnerabilities [7, 95]. Stack pointer can be addressed to an IO or an adversary
controlled memory region that will not be cleaned after RC execution so that
information about attestation and key can be leaked. Output address can be addressed
to stack in order to corrupt that region, which is used by RC at the time of attestation,
when output is written [7].
Interrupts must be disabled for the architectures that uses a processor whose interrupt
routines are not fixed addresses can be set manually. The reason is that RC can be
partially called if an interrupt routine is addressed to RC code area and invoked at
the time of RC execution. On the contrary a violation will be detected in case of a
triggered interrupt if interrupt routines have fixed addresses outside of RC code and a
secure reset mechanism will be set. Although disabling interrupts are discussed to be
optional by the SMART paper [7], this design rule is added by Francillon et. al. [95].
Therefore disabling interrupts are given as the 1st step of the Algorithm 6.
Another design rule is that SMART can not reserve data memory, it can not use global
variables and the heap to avoid relying on trusted data [7]. So, RC code can only work
on the stack using local variables and registers.
Finally, exit protocol of attestation that is given by the SMART paper [7] is modified.
A jump protocol is added instead of a call procedure at the step 7 of the Algorithm
6. Although a call procedure is given, a jump procedure is described in the text of
SMART 5. According to the architecture algorithm can only exit from the one last
instruction. In case of a function call in the 7th step, the RC code would have two exit
points. The hardware can be modified in this way however complexity of the atomic
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execution hardware increases. Therefore 7th step is optimized for a better design by
adding a prepare jump code. In this way, algorithm changes the return address of RC
code with jump address x if necessary conditions are satisfied. Then algorithm exits
from last instruction.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, formal description and principles of SMART architecture design is
explained by using papers [7, 95]. Weaknesses and implementation details of the
scheme is discussed and design rules of the architecture are explained. The attestation
code procedure is updated according to discussed design rules and presented as a
final pseudo code in the Algorithm 6. Abstract design of the SMART architecture
is discussed and meaning of additional hardware is summarized.
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6. SOFTWARE DESIGN
Software implementation of the SMART scheme is discussed in this chapter. First
a hash function is chosen for the design of checksum function. The chosen hash
function should be lightweight since the code will be executed in each attestation as an
additional burden to real purpose of the processor.
A comparison of hash functions is published by Balasch et. al. on AVR AtTiny85
microprocessor is given by Balasch et. al. [8,96]. Comparision results of SHA3 finalist
are shown in the Figure 6.1 and and lightweight hash algorithms are given in the Figure
6.2.
Keccak algorithm is chosen as SHA3 standard [36]. Moreover, the code size of
Keccak[1600] is minimum and its hashing speed is third best when it is compared
with other SHA3 finalists. It can observed from the Figure 6.1 that the marginal
difference between keccak and the fastest algorithm very smaller than the fourth
algorithm. In addition, a lightweight version as Keccak[400] has second best speed
and third minimum code size comparing to other lightweight hash algorithms as can
be observed from the Figure 6.2. In fact, marginal differences of Keccak[400] with the
best of lightweight algorithms are very small.
A keyed hash function is necessary for the SMART scheme. Keccak as SHA3 standard
is resistant against length extension attacks on the contrary of SHA1 and SHA2
standards. Therefore, a padding scheme like HMAC is not necessary for SHA3 in
order to build a keyed hash construction (MAC). Only prepending the key with the
message is enough MAC constructed SHA3 [36].
For these reasons a lightweight version of Keccak function is chosen for the design
of SMART code. In Keccak algorithm, mathematical operations are applied to a
state array that has 25 elements after the message is initialized to a part of it as will
be explained in this chapter. Most efficient way to use this state array is to choose
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Figure 6.1: Comparision of code size and cycle count/bytes (100 bytes length
messages) of implementation of SHA3 finalists on AVR AtTiny
microprocessor [8].
its element size equal to word length of the microprocessor. Since 8051 is an 8 bit
microprocessor, the size of the elements of state array is chosen as 8 bit. As a result
Keccak[200] (Keccak[r=40, c=160]) is chosen for the keyed hash function of SMART
code.
This chapter starts with the explanation of hash functions and the Keccak algorithm.
Then, the implementation of Keccak on 8051 microprocessor is discussed and the final
design of the attestation algorithm is explained. Implementation details for the given
platform and chosen compiler is explained. Trade of between code size and speed is
given. Moreover effects of secure design rules given in Chapter 5 on the performance
of code is discussed.
6.1 Keccak Algorithm (SHA3)
Keccak is a family of sponge functions, which is a function that uses sponge
construction, that rely on permutation. The sponge construction and the Keccak
algorithm are explained in the next subchapters.
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6.1.1 The sponge construction
In cryptography, the sponge construction is an iterated construction based on a fixed
length permutation f operating on a padding rule to build a function F mapping variable
length input to variable length output [97]. It operates on fixed number of b bits using
a state of b=r+c bits. The value b, r and c are called the width, the bitrate and the
capacity respectively.
As seen in the Figure 6.3 the construction is made with padding and two phases which
are absorbing and squeezing. In the initialization and padding phase, the input message
is padded with a reversible padding rule and split into bitrate width (r bits) blocks. The
b bits width state is initialized to zero. During the absorbing phase, the partitioned
r bits input message blocks are XORed with the first r bits of the state and processed
through the function f. After all the blocks are processed similarly, the squeezing phase
starts. In the squeezing phase, the first r bits of the state is returned and concatenated
47
Figure 6.3: The Sponge Construction [9].
with the previous one to generate output and the state is processed through the function
f repeatedly until the desired output length is reached.
The sponge constructions can be used to build hash functions, stream ciphers,
pseudo-random bit generators and they have many advantages [97]:
• The flexibility to choose the adequate bit rate/capacity values while using
the same permutation
• Simple security claims: The expected complexity resistance level of the
sponge construction is 2c/2 [98].
• It has a variable length output meaning that the output bit length can be
chosen freely.
• Disentangled from the output length: the output length doesn’t determine
the security level.
• It is secure against generic state recovery attacks.
6.1.2 Keccak overview
Keccak is a family of hash functions based on a sponge construction that uses Keccak-f
permutation function as fundamental. The pseudo-code for the Keccak[r,c] hash
function is shown in the Algorithm 7 where the parameters c is the capacity, r is the
bitrate and M is the message whose length is multiple of the 8 bit. The algorithm works
same as sponge construction with its padding, absorbing and squeezing parts. The S
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is denoted for the state array and Pi is used for the r bits width blocks of the padded
message while the || symbol represents the concatenation.
Algorithm 7 The pseudo-code of the Keccak[r,c] [9].
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There are seven Keccak-f permutations, indicated by Keccak-f[b] where the
permutation width b=r+c defines the state of the sponge function and b ∈ {25, 50,
100, 200, 400, 800, 1600}. The state is an array of 5 × 5 lanes whose bit length w
is b/25 (w ∈ {1,2,4,8,16,32,64}). The iteration number nr of the Keccak-f[b] function
is calculated by nr = 12+2×l where l=w/2 and this gives a set of round number nr ∈
{12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24} for the set of permutation width b.
The pseudo-code of the Keccak-f[b] permutation algorithm is shown in the
Algorithm 8. The state array is denoted by A and A[x,y] shows a particular lane in
that state. The rotation constants r[x,y] and the round constants RC[i] of the algorithm
are shown in the Figure 6.4. The rotation constants are given in 64 bit hexadecimal
format and it can be truncated for a smaller w. B[x,y], C[x], D[x] are intermediate
variables. All the operations of the indices are done in modulo 5. Bitwise cyclic shift
operation is shown with ROT (w,r), which moves a bit from position i into position
i+ r in the modulo lane size. The Keccak-f algorithm inputs and outputs state array
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Algorithm 8 The pseudo-code of the Keccak-f[b] [9].
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D[x] = C[x− 1]⊕ ROT(C[x+ 1], 1)ǰ ∀x  0 . . . 4
A[x, y] = A[x, y]⊕ D[x]ǰ ∀(x, y)  (0 . . . 4, 0 . . . 4)
ρ юћё pi ѠѡђѝѠ
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χ Ѡѡђѝ
A[x, y] = B[x, y]⊕ ((NOT B[x+ 1, y])AND B[x+ 2, y])ǰ ∀(x, y)  (0 . . . 4, 0 . . . 4)
ι Ѡѡђѝ
A[0, 0] = A[0, 0]⊕ RC
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algorithm [9].
and processes it with some mathematical operations in five states that are theta, rho,
pi, chi and iota (θ ,ρ,pi,χ and ι).
6.2 The Implementation of the SMART Attestation Algorithm on the 8051
This topic covers the software design of the attestation algorithm of the SMART
architecture for the 8051. It starts with memory management of the 8051 and examines
the implementation of the Keccak algorithm by looking at three parameters, the
memory consumption, the code size and the speed of different codes, which are written
in C and assembly (ASM) programming languages.
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Table 6.1: Some of the memory type specifiers of the SDCC and Keil for the 8051 [3].
Memory Type Description
code Program memory (64 KBytes); accessed by opcode MOVC
@A+DPTR.
data Directly addressable to first 128 bytes of internal data
memory (fastest access).
idata Indirectly addressable internal data memory (Using R0, R1
registers); accessed across the full internal address space
(256 bytes).
xdata External data memory (64 KBytes); accessed by opcode
MOVX @DPTR.
pdata Paged (256 bytes) external data memory; accessed by
opcode MOVX @Rn.
6.2.1 Memory management
Looking at the memory management of the Intel 8051 is important to understand the
time consumption of the algorithms and design choices. As discussed before, the Intel
8051 has two types of memory that are program memory (ROM) and data memory
(RAM) with an address bus of 16 bit and 8 bit respectively. In addition to its 256 bytes
of internal RAM as data memory, it can use an 256 KBytes of external RAM. Since
the 128 bytes of its internal RAM is used for the Special function registers, only its
first 128 bytes can be used for program data memory. Moreover, the first 32 bytes (4
banks with 8 registers) of it are the registers of the processor.
SDCC and Keil compilers use some memory specifiers to assign a variable to a specific
or an implicitly assigned area. Relevant specifiers are shown in the Table 6.1.
The access speeds to these regions are different. The cyle refers to instruction cycle
for the following of the thesis and 1 instruction cycle is 12 clock cycle for the 8051
architecture. The fastest access is possible to internal RAM, while the slowest one
is to ROM. The MOVX, MOVC instruction takes 2 instruction cycles and regular
MOV instructions take 1 cycle. The DPTR register can be loaded in 2 cycles by using
DPH and DPL registers (1+1=2 cycle) or direct initializing. So, regular external RAM
accesses takes 4 cycles using the xdata specifier and 3 cycles using the pdata specifier
(only the first 256 bytes), while direct and indirect internal RAM accesses take 1 and 2
cycles respectively. The compilers use these features and give three compiling options
as seen in the Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Default memory usage for the compiling memory models [4].
Memory
Model
Parameters and
Automatic
Variables
Default
Global
Variables
Default
Constant
Variables
Default
Pointer Size
Small data data data 3 bytes
Compact pdata pdata pdata 3 bytes
Large xdata xdata xdata 3 bytes
In default mode the SDCC and the Keil compilers assign every variable as global and
address them to the specific locations in RAM. The assigned variables are used from
the constant RAM addresses instead of referencing from the stack pointer. Since access
of any variable in the internal RAM becomes as fast as registers, better performance
is gained by this way. Stack is only used for parameter passing between functions. In
fact, registers are the globally addressed first 32 bytes of the internal RAM in 8051.
6.2.2 Design choices
Because of the security concerns of the SMART architecture, only the internal RAM
can be used from the attestation code as discussed before. The processor must have the
necessary area for the attestation code before its execution. The available internal RAM
area is the total of the 32 bytes of registers and 96 bytes of stack. The user application
stops while the execution of the attestation code. Considering the constraints of the
platform and the SMART architecture, the speed and the memory consumption are
very critical for a compact SMART design and a lightweight algorithm should be
chosen for the attestation code.
In addition to fact that the Keccak (SHA3) is the last standard of the secure hash
algorithms, the speed and the memory usage of the algorithm is one of the bests
between the finalists. Therefore, a lightweight version of the Keccak algorithm is
decided to be used for the attestation code. The bit rate parameter r and the capacity
parameter c are set to 40 and 160 respectively. This means that the security level is 280,
the algorithm will process 40 bits at a time and the lane size of the inner state is 8 bit,
which gives the usage of 25 bytes internal state. The width of the output hash value
is chosen as 224 bit, which is the shortest in the standard, but changing it to a bigger
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value effects the cost of the algorithm such little for the long messages that it can be
ignored.
SDCC is used as the compiler since it is free. All of the necessary operations for this
design can be done and optimized efficiently when assembly is also used.
Some design tricks are made for an efficient design. Registers can’t be used directly
in SDCC and the program grows enormously if local variables are used. Moreover,
the code size grows and the speed decreases a lot when the stack is used to place
local variables. Because of the design rules of the SMART architecture, using a global
variable isn’t allowed. Therefore the ability to use registers is very important. In order
to use registers an unused array is defined to tell the compiler that all of the registers
will be used. Then, the necessary registers are addressed and used from the SMART
code. Another benefit of this method is that the attestation algorithm can use all of the
register banks instead of one. In the working philosophy of the SDCC compiler, each
program is responsible for keeping its own registers. So, all of the necessary variables
kept in registers are put and taken from the stack by the functions before and after any
function call.
6.2.3 Implementation of Keccak (SHA3) on the 8051
Implementation of the Keccak[r=40, c=160] algorithm using SDCC for the 8051 is
discussed in this section. The Keccak[40,160] hash algorithm is used that uses the
Keccak-f[200] permutation function.
The Algorithm 7 is the top module of the Keccak and it produces 40 bit hash result for
a 40 bit message after absorbing phase. In order to produce 224 bit output Keccak-f
function is called 5 times more in the squeezing phase.
As seen in the Algorithm 8, most of the mathematical operations of the sponge function
is in the Keccak-f part. The Keccak-f function makes at least 12 iterations to find the
hash result. The input and output of the Keccak-f algorithm is the state array. Design
of Keccak-f effects the code speed and the code size significantly since it is the most
time consuming part and it is called many times.
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Table 6.3: The cost and the speed comparison of the implementations of
Keccak-f[200] that reserves memory on 8051 using SDCC. SM: Small
model design
Keccak-f Permutation Sofware Designs on 8051
1st 2nd 3rd 4th (ASM) 5th (ASM)
RAM Data [bytes] 25 25 25 25 25
Registers [8-bit] 9 13 13 12 12
Total LUT Size [bytes] 76 66 18 18 18
Code Size [bytes] (SM) 466 605 904 443 547
Inst. Cycle count (SM) 76551 61683 15311 7305 5325
Table 6.4: The cost and the speed comparison of the Keccak-f[200] implementations
that only uses stack and registers on 8051 using SDCC. SU: stack used
model design.
Keccak-f Permutation Sofware Designs on 8051
1st 2nd 3rd 4th (ASM) 5th (ASM)
RAM Data [bytes] 25 25 25 25 25
Registers [8-bit] 9 13 13 12 12
Total LUT Size [bytes] 76 66 18 18 18
Code Size [bytes] (SU) 504 697 1749 637 772
Inst. Cycle count (SU) 83277 69381 28814 9052 8188
While the Keccak top function is the controller part, the cost of the SHA3 comes from
the Keccak-f function. Therefore, Keccak-f function is designed efficiently by using
ASM while the top module is written in C for flexibility.
As discussed before, SDCC assigns every variable as global to the internal RAM in the
small model. However, SMART attestation code can not reserve memory for its own
use [7]. Indirect accessing is used in order to use stack as memory. In this method,
a frame pointer is addressed to the functions and other variables are called using their
references to that pointer. This method decreases the speed and increases the size of
the algorithm by around of the factor two. SMART architecture can be adapted to use
its own memory by making additional hardware optimization.
As a result, two versions of software implementations, which are the small model (SM)
and stack using model (SU), are designed to investigate the cost of design choices. The
state array is either addressed globally or written to the stack depending on the small
model or not. Other variables are assigned to registers in both designs.
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As seen in the Algorithm 7 Keccak-f inputs and outputs the state array. One coding
style for a fast and small program is to design one function for Keccak and Keccakf in
a way that program flow is controlled by using goto instruction. However, it is known
that using goto is not a good software programming way. The same performance and
area properties can be reached if no time is consumed for the parameter passing. This
is done with a few tricks and using ASM. The Keccak function reserves the necessary
memory for all functions. Keccak-f function does not pass any parameter and it knows
the address of the state array in the memory. While the small model designs uses the
fix address of the state array, stack used model designs know the reference distance to
the frame pointer.
10 software implementations of Keccak-f function are shown in the Table 6.3 - 6.4.
Table 6.3 shows small model design (SM) implementations while the Table 6.4 shows
the stack used model design implementations. First three implementations are written
in C and the last two are designed in ASM. Same optimization steps are applied to
program codes of the stack using model and the small model in the Table 6.3 and
Table 6.4 and they follow the same program flow. However, they are different codes
especially for the forth and fifth implementations, which are written in ASM.
The first code minimizes the area and it is adapted from the one named avr8.c in the
reference source codes of Keccak [99]. The constants are placed to the look-up (LUT)
tables and loops are used to apply same mathematical operations to the elements of
LUTs. It uses 4 LUTs that are RC[i] round constants, the r[x,y] cyclic shift offsets and
two tables for the indices. One of the indices table is to keep modular-5 numbers and
the other one is for the state indices of the Rho-Pi phase. The LUT size in the Table
6.3 references to these tables.
In the third code, 3 LUTS (ones except RC[i]) and their loops are unrolled and
optimized. These loop unrolling operations can only be done with using extra register.
The loop of RC[i] constants isn’t unrolled in none of implementations since it is the
main iteration loop of the Algorithm 8.
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Table 6.5: The Keccak-224 implementations on 8051 where r=40 and c=160. (cycle
refers to instruction cycle)
RAM
data
[bytes]
Registers
[8-bit]
Code
size
[bytes]
Rate of short
messages
(30 byte)
[cycle/byte]
Rate of long
messages
(1000 byte)
[cycle/byte]
Small Model 31 (25+6) 15 709 1953 1532
Stack Used M. 31 (25+6) 15 1084 2740 1713
The second code is given to show a middle trade. The Rho-Pi phase isn’t unrolled in
this implementation. There is one more loop in addition to the iteration loop in all of
these three designs and Chi, Iota and a part of Theta phases are combined in this loop.
The third code is taken as reference implementation because of its speed and the fourth
code is designed with ASM optimization. Finally, more optimization is done after theta
phase is combined completely and the last loop of the round loop is unrolled thanks to
efficient coding capabilities of ASM. The fifth code as the final implementation in the
Table 6.3 only has one main round iteration using different RC[i] constants.
The ratio of the speed and the code size between small model and the stack used
model is smaller in the fourth and the fifth implementations when they are compared
with the first three implementations thanks to ASM coding. R0 and R1 registers are
efficiently used to access internal RAM in ASM designs. Having two more pointers
give good opportunities to track the variables and access them without changing any
other register for addressing. This is very beneficial especially for the stack used model
implementations since a variable can only be accessed after its address is calculated
using its distance to the frame pointer of the function every time.
Finally, fifth Keccak-f implementations, which are coded in ASM, are used and the rest
of the Algorithm 7 is coded in C language. Two final designs are produced as given in
the Table 6.5.
Implemented Keccak codes has two inputs, an input pointer and an output pointer.
They are stored in the stack for both cases with a total cost of 6 bytes (2 × 3 bytes). In
addition, three more registers are used for the indexes.
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A generic pointer can address any kind of memory specifier. However, they are slower
than the specified pointers. For this reason none of the pointers are defined as generic.
The aim of the attestation code is to verify the code space so pointers are specified to
the ROM memory. The hashing rate of long messages is faster than short messages.
The difference mainly comes from the squeezing phase of the Keccak algorithm where
the hash output is generated. In this phase Keccak-f permutation is called 5 times more
to produce 224 bit output although the algorithm processes 40 bit.
6.3 Design of the SMART Attestation Code
The explanation of the SMART attestation code is given in Algorithm 6. The algorithm
inputs pointers to the attestation region start and end addresses, pointer to the nonce,
the xflag, function pointer for the jump address and input of the targeted function. The
performance results of the SMART software implementations are given in the Table
6.6.
SMART attestation code is designed by obeying certain design rules as discussed in
Section 5.
Designed SMART code is placed in a different ROM in the program address space.
This is achieved by a regular software design that places the SMART code to a
specified area. Placing a piece of code a specified area can be achieved in a few ways.
Since mapping the addresses of functions is the duty of the linker, certain directives
can be given to force a custom design. One of them is to use codeseg directive to target
a function to a certain address by giving it as a pragma in the code or as a compiler
directive during the compilation [100]. SDCC only allows two partitions of the code
to be targeted in this method. The second way is to write the complete program in
assembly and specify the address in the code. Inline assembly can only be used for
the body of a function so it cannot be used for this aim. Another way is to compile a
library file by using libsdcc tool.
Although generic pointers give the flexibility to address any type of memory, they call
some compiler subroutines to work in the way of SDCC [100]. These subroutines are
the assembly codes that check the type of the generic pointers and they are placed with
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Table 6.6: Designed smart attestation codes. (cycle refers to instruction cycle)
RAM data
[bytes]
Registers
[8-bit]
Code
size
[bytes]
Rate of short
messages
(30 byte)
[cycle/byte]
Rate of long
messages
(1000 byte)
[cycle/byte]
Small Model 37 (25+12) 15 1082 2768 1558
Stack Used Model 37 (25+12) 15 1472 3650 1742
the compiled program in default. However the SMART code mustn’t leave its address
space. Therefore, they must be copied to the area of the SMART code if they are
used. This can only be done by designing an independent library [100]. Otherwise,
it causes a design violation that the SMART code is not completely run in its address
space. Generic pointers not only make the program slower but also make it bigger.
Considering these reasons no pointer is used as generic in this implementation of the
SMART code.
As discussed before the SMART can not reserve memory for its own use however a
special RAM can be added to processor. In order to show the cost of this change two
SMART implementations are designed using the Keccak shown in the Algorithm 7.
Both designs uses registers for the variables except the state array.
Stack used model implementation is only become possible if the function is defined
as reentrant in SDCC. Normally defining a function as reentrant is used to design
functions that can be called safely before its previous invocation completed. However
it is used in this concept since it assigns a stack area to the function.
Another requirement of the SMART is to disable interrupts if interrupt service routines
can be addressed manually. Since this is the case for the 8051, interrupts are disabled
at the start of the algorithm by setting the EA flag of the interrupt register. This can be
done by defining a function as critical in SDCC [100].
The output address, the stack address and the address to jump to after the attestation
must be checked as discussed in the chapter 5. Since the pointers are not generic, they
can only address their specified address space. The output pointer is specified to the
RAM therefore checking it becomes unnecessary. The stack is addressed to the internal
RAM since the code is compiled as small model whose memory usage is given in the
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Table 6.2. The pointer of the address that will be jumped after the execution is checked
to prevent program to go to program space of the SMART code.
Another design rule is that any intermediate values must be cleaned from memory.
Therefore all registers and RAM locations between the stack pointer and frame pointer
are set to zero. At the end of SMART code execution, program flow jump to another
function if the xflag is set as can be seen from the Algorithm 7, this functionality can
not be gained without using ASM programming language because of the reasons that
are discussed in the following.
Calling a function using a function pointer or jumping to an address using goto are
not the solution for the necessary need. The SMART function can return the given
function pointer and direct program flow to that program. However the program flow
comes back to the last address of the SMART function instead of the main function
after the execution of the addressed function is finished. This is a violation of the
atomic execution given in the Algorithm 5.
The functionality of jumping to a given function and passing a parameter as an input
to that function can be gained with ASM coding for the SMART code. An ASM
code is added to change the return address that is stored in the stack at the start of the
SMART code. The explanation of the program flow is given: The SMART code starts
execution when it is called. The return address, showing the address that the SMART
is called, is pushed to the stack as regular. In the end, the added ASM code changes the
return address in the stack with the given function pointer if the xflag input is set. So
program goes to the given function instead of the regular a return. The first variable of
a function is passed using DPTR register in 8051. This parameter passing mechanism
is also applied for the SMART manually. ASM code changes the DPTR with the given
input before the SMART returns to the given function.
Prepending the key and the nonce to the message is enough for a keyed hash version
of Keccak. Therefore, the result of the key of the absorbing phase, shown in the
Algorithm 7, is initialized to the state array before the message is hashed. The nonce
is concatenated with the message.
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Figure 6.7: Performance comparison of SMART attestation code and SHA3 algorithm
for both long messages (1000 Bytes) and short messages (30 Bytes).
The final results of SMART code design is given in the Table 6.6. The SMART
implementation and the SHA3 implementation can be compared by looking the Table
6.6 and the Table 6.5 as shown in the Figure 6.7. It can be seen that the speed of the
code is not changed too much while the code size is increased a little. The reason is
that additional loops are used to hash the key and the nonce in the SMART design.
The increase of the RAM data consumption comes from the input parameters of the
SMART function since they are placed to the stack.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the software design of the SMART remote attestation architecture
for the 8051 microprocessor is explained. A lightweight version of Keccak hash
algorithm (SHA3) is used for the checksum function of the attestation. SHA3
algorithm is explained and trade off between the speed and code size of the algorithm
is presented. 10 different Keccak-f function, which is the sponge construction of
SHA3, is implemented. After the code is written using C programming language,
loop unrolling and ASM inlining is used for optimization. It is seen that both code size
and speed has become better after these optimizations as can be seen in the Figure 6.5
and Figure 6.5.
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All design rules of the SMART scheme, which is also explained in chapter 5, are
applied using the hash function. Design problems and choices are explained. At the
end two different program code is produced. Although one of the design rule is that the
RC code (SMART program code) can not reserve memory for itself, a program called
small model is designed in addition to stack using model. It is a common compiler
optimization for lightweight embedded systems to globally address all the variables to
memory, the performance loss to force the program to use stack is presented.
The code size and program speed of Keccak (SHA3) function and SMART code can
be investigated by looking Figure 6.7. The code size and the time that is consumed
to calculate hash increase more dramatically for the stack used model than the small
model. In addition, hashing speed decreases a lot more for short messages comparing
to long messages. The reason is that a random number nonce has to be sent to provider
by challenger as explained in Chapter 5. This random number has to be big enough to
keep freshness of result and 160 bit is considered as a satisfied number. Moreover, 80
bit key, which is enough since security level of Keccak[200] is 80, is prepended to the
message. As a result, hash result of 60 Bytes, whose 20 bytes are nonce and 10 Bytes
are key, are calculated in order to take hash of 30 bytes of sensitive data.
No other Keccak[r=40, c=160] implementation can be found for the 8051 at the
time of this thesis is written. However there are some implementation or estimation
results for Keccak[1600] function in the paper [101, 102]. In addition, ASM software
implementations of SHA3 finalists on AVR AtTiny85 microprocessor are given by
Balasch et. al. [8, 96]. The best numbers for the 224 bits of output of Keccak[1600]
are 1648 bytes/cycle for 8051 and 1794 bytes/cycle for AVR AtTiny85. Moreover,
a lightweight implementation for Keccak[r=144,c=256] is given as 3629 bytes/cycle
for 100 bytes length message and 2627 bytes/cycle for 500 bytes length message by
Balasch et. al. [8]. Our implementation results are 1532 and 1953 bytes/instruction
cycle respectively for small messages and long messages as given in the Table 6.5.
Although it is not fair to compare Keccak[200] with Keccak[1600] or Keccak[400],
our implementation seems efficient.
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Since each instruction of Keccak-f function is optimized using ASM and top level
control block is coded in C efficiently, final design of the program is considered as
compact and efficient implementation.
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7. HARDWARE DESIGN
Smart scheme is implemented FPGA for 8051 architecture. Dalton core [103]
is modified and used for the implementation of 8051 microprocessor on a Xilinx
Spartan 6 CSG324 FPGA. Hardware implementation details of the SMART scheme is
discussed in this chapter. Cost, compactness and design effort of the SMART scheme
are examined for this restrictive microprocessor.
7.1 The Hardware of 8051
The 8051 implementation of the California’s Dalton Project, which is synchronous as
same as the standard, is used in this project. The architecture of the 8051 dalton core
hardware is given in the Figure 7.1. While the execution of the processor, instructions
are read from the ROM by the controller hardware and op-code of the instruction is
learned from the decoder. Then necessary control signals of ALU and internal RAM
are set by the controller hardware in order to execute the read instruction. Execution
state generally starts with a read from RAM and finishes by writing the result of ALU
to RAM. In addition, external RAM is used by the controller hardware if necessary.
Implementation of a smaller version of microprocessor is presented in the following
sections. Implemented core has 4 KB ROM and 2 KB external memory although they
are 64 KB in the standard. In addition, the external memory is embedded into the core.
Implementation details of 8051 core, which is not modified, for the targeted FPGA is
shown in the Table 7.1. Implemented hardware is smaller and faster than the standard.
Therefore, the cost of additional hardware shows a lower boundary for the standard
implementation.
Table 7.1: Implementation Results of the Embedded 8051 Core
Number of Slice Registers 1.363
Number of Slice LUTs 2.759
Number of RAMB16BWERs 4
Maximum Clock Frequency 58.072 MHz, (min period: 17.22 ns)
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Figure 7.1: Architecture of the Dalton implemantation of 8051.
7.2 Hardware Design of the SMART
Hardware modifications to 8051 architecture are necessary as discussed in the Chapter
5. Exclusive key accesses to attestation code and atomic execution of the attestation
code must be forced by an additional hardware that reads program counter (PC).
An implementation of the SMART scheme, which is very same in all details with the
proposed system by El Defrawy et. al. [7] and Francillon et. al. [95], is explained in
this topic. In the end implementation details for the explained hardware is presented
and compared with the non modified 8051 Dalton hardware core.
7.2.1 Standard implementation of SMART architecture
An additional hardware is deployed between the controller unit and the ROM-RAM
memories as shown in 7.2. The additional hardware takes data address and PC as input
and outputs whether the Key or RAM data. An internal reset occurs and resets the
memory in case of a violation of atomic execution and key access rules.
Top level schematic of the additional hardware is shown in the Figure 7.3. As can be
seen in the figure, the data address and PC is compared with low-high values of the key
and the attestation code address to learn the state of the memory accesses. It should
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Figure 7.2: Standard Implementation of SMART Architecture for 8051
be observed that these addresses are constant. Size of the comparison hardware blocks
depend on these constant addresses.
Regarding to atomic execution rule, smart attestation code (RC code) can only be
invoked from the start and can be exit from the last instruction as explained in
Chapter 5. Two checks should be realized for a PC based implementation of atomic
execution control hardware as explained in Algorithm 5: (1) If the PC is in the RC but
differs from the start of the RC, then the previous instruction must also be in the RC.
(2) If the PC is outside of the RC, then the previous instruction must be outside of the
RC, except for the last instruction of the RC.
Comparison circuits of the designed hardware can be done efficiently with a small
trick. Reserving 2k bits memory space for the additional RAM after 2k bits data
RAM of 2n bit data memory space provides a smaller circuit that only compares high
significant (n−k) bits of n bits address. For instance, if 4 KB memory area is reserved
for the attestation code (RC) after 4 KB program code in a 16 bit address space,
looking high significant 4 bits of PC is enough to understand whether the PC is in
the RC or not. However, knowing that the program flow is in the last instruction of the
RC is necessary to control atomic execution. Therefore, an address called RC_exit is
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Figure 7.3: Hardware of the Memory Controller
defined for the termination address of RC and this is used instead of RC_high in atomic
execution hardware. This is also a more realistic approach since many compilers put
some constant tables or sub-functions before or after attestation code as discussed
in Section 6. It should be mentioned that this is dangerous for the situations where
hardware attacks are considered since an additional IO or a memory block can be
integrated. Note that this optimization is not shown in Figure 7.6 in order to keep the
coherency with the proposed scheme.
While the memory access_control hardware, which is given in the Figure 7.3, is mostly
combinational, a memory element is necessary for the atomic execution hardware in
order to keep previous value of the PC. Instead of reserving 16 Flip Flops (FF) for the
previous PC and deploying relatively big comparison hardware for it, as given by the
Sancus team and shown in the Figure 7.10, an efficient implementation is presented in
this thesis that only uses 1 FF with a smaller logic.
Information of being in RC region in the previous instruction is stored to one Flip
Flop, which is named as PCinRC in the following, for the atomic execution. In order
to visualize hardware designs truth tables are given in this chapter. The truth table for
the behavior of the PCinRC FF is given in the Table 7.2. PCinRC FF is set to logical
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Table 7.2: Truth Table for the input of the PCinRC Flip flop
PC_eq PC_eq PC_in_RC PCinRC PCinRC
RC_h RC_l space FF_q FF_d
(0) 1 (0) 1 1
(0) (0) 1 1 1
(0) 1 (0) 0 1
All other Combinations 0
high when PC equals to the low address of RC and its output is logical zero. Then it
is kept as logical high while the execution of RC. In the last instruction of RC, the FF
is set to logical zero. Final design of the atomic execution hardware is shown in the
Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4: Flip flop hardware for Atomic Execution
Internal Reset signal is designed as the output of the OR logic of two reset circuits as
presented in the Figure 7.5. The First reset hardware checks if the key is accessed from
the RC code and the second one is the violation output the atomic execution.
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Figure 7.5: Internal Reset Hardware
The truth tables for the reset mechanism are given in the Table 7.3 and the Table 7.4.
Intern_rst2 signal rises in two conditions: (1) The output of PCinRC FF is logical 1
and PC is not in the RC address space (2) The output of PCinRC FF is logical 0 and
PC is in the RC address space while it is not equal to RC low or RC high addresses.
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Figure 7.6: Hardware of the Memory Controller for Standard Implementation
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Table 7.3: Truth Table for the Internal Reset 1 (Access of Key)
PC_out_RC_space Data_addr_in_key_space intern_rst1
1 1 1
All other Combinations 0
Table 7.4: Truth Table for the Internal Reset 2 (Atomic Execution)
PC_eq PC_eq PC_in_RC PCinRC intern_rst2
RC_h RC_l space FF_q
0 0 0 1 1
(0) (0) 1 0 1
All other Combinations 0
The schematic view for the additional circuit that showing all parts is given in the
Figure 7.6.
The key is placed to the next address after the 2KB XRAM data memory and the key
space is defined as 25 bytes. Although internal ram memory can be used faster and
external RAM is convenient for the products where external ram is controlled with the
input and output pots (IOs) of the processor, XRAM address space is chosen since
internal memory is very limited. However, modified versions for this architecture that
shows efficient ways will be presented in the following topics.
The explained system is implemented for the targeted FPGA. The implementation
results are shown in the Table 7.5. It can be observed that hardware changes are very
minor when the Table 7.5 and the Table 7.1 are compared. Extra ROM memories are
added to store the attestation code and the key. The critical path of the microprocessor
is increased because of secure reset mechanism implemented. Final critical path is
given between reset input signal and internal ram. The maximum operating frequency
of 58.072 MHz is reduced by negligible amount (0,008%) and the increase in the area
is minor, which is 0,014% for registers and 0,047% for LUTs.
Table 7.5: Implementation results of standard SMART architecture
Number of Slice Registers 1.383
Number of Slice LUTs 2.891
Number of RAMB16BWERs 4
Number of RAMB8BWERs 0
Maximum Clock Frequency 57.577 MHz, (min period: 17.368 ns)
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7.2.2 Modified SMART architecture that uses exclusive memory
According to design rules of SMART, attestation program (RC) cannot reserve
memory in order to avoid untrusted data. However, it can be observed from Table 6.6
and Figure 6.7 that code size increases 36% and speed decreases 12% when stack used
model (SU) is used instead of small model (SM). It should be mentioned that the SU
program is designed very efficiently using ASM and an efficient variable addressing
method as explained in Section 6. Therefore the difference between SM and SU would
be even bigger for most of the designs. For this reason, an approach is developed for a
better architecture in terms of area and speed.Modified 2 for 8051
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Figure 7.7: 8051 SMART architecture that uses exclusive memory
An exclusive additional RAM, which is 25 bytes for this design, is deployed into the
internal RAM address space as an alternative memory for the use of RC of SMART as
shown in Figure 7.9. A data selection circuit that switches the memories internal RAM
and additional exclusive RAM depending on the state of PC to be in RC is deployed
to input of internal RAM data bus. Exclusive memory is placed to address out of the
memory spaces of user registers and special function registers in order not to crash
processor settings.
In order to implement SMART to any architecture, processor’s RAM must be changed
with a resetable one in order to implement secure reset mechanism that resets
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everything in one clock cycle. However, this will increase the power and area. On the
other, hand our approach also optimizes this requirement by only deploying a small
resetable memory for the use of RC.
The data selection circuit, which is shown in the Figure 7.8, only consists MUXes
that is controlled with the output of the FF of additional memory controller hardware,
which is shown in Figure 7.6. Therefore minor changes are applied to modify
implemented SMART architecture. The MUX selects the data to send the internal
memory data bus. If the PC is in the RC code and data address is in the exclusive RC
RAM, exclusive RAM is Read and its output is selected. Microprocessor continue to
work in other cases.
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Figure 7.8: Data selection hardware of the Exclusive memory of Modified SMART
Architecture
SMART team [7] conditions stack used model in order to provide minimality and
avoid leakage. However, deploying an additional RAM as proposed in the Figure 7.7
for the use of the attestation code decreases total cost of additional hardware although
total change in architecture seems to be increasing. However total cost of additional
memory since code size of RC decreases
Table 7.6: Implementation of the modified SMART architecture that uses exclusive
internal memory
Number of Slice Registers 1.386
Number of Slice LUTs 2.979
Number of RAMB16BWERs 3
Number of RAMB8BWERs 1
Maximum Clock Frequency 56.561 MHz, (min period: 17.680 ns)
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The modified system is implemented for the targeted FPGA. The implementation
results of hardware design is given in the Table 7.5. It can be observed that hardware
change and clock change is negligible while the total RAM usage is decreased as
expected when the Table 7.6 and the Table 7.5 are compared. As a result, an
architecture is proposed to support memory reserving attestation code so that the
system can be implemented with faster attestation algorithms. In addition, the size
of the processor becomes smaller.
7.2.3 Modified SMART architecture using key in exclusive memory address space
Placing key to an alternative address like RC exclusive RAM as shown in the Figure
7.9 is a more efficient approach. key memory is placed after RC exclusive RAM in a
same way as shown in Figure 7.9. Thanks to this, the unified memory area of the key
and RC exclusive RAM are treated like the key address space of SMART architecture.
This optimizes the comparison circuit of exclusive RAM. In addition, first internal
reset circuit, which controls the key accesses, becomes unnecessary since key can only
be accessed from RC code. As a platform specific result, 15 bit address comparison
circuit of key is turned to 8 bit comparison.Modified 3 for 8051
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Figure 7.9: 8051 SMART architecture that uses key in exclusive memory address
space
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Table 7.7: Implementation of the modified SMART architecture in which key is placed
to exclusive memory address space
Number of Slice Registers 1.369
Number of Slice LUTs 2.789
Number of RAMB16BWERs 3
Number of RAMB8BWERs 1
Maximum Clock Frequency 57.776 MHz, (min period: 17.509 ns)
The modified SMART architecture, which is given in the Figure 7.9, is implemented
on the targeted FPGA. Implementation results are given in the Table 7.7. The area
becomes smaller that the standard implementation, which is shown in the Table 7.5, of
the SMART and maximum frequency is increased.
7.3 Conclusion
An efficient hardware implementation of SMART scheme for 8051 is designed on the
Spartan 6 CGS324 in this chapter. Attestation code uses SHA3 for the keyed hash
function. SMART scheme uses PC based memory controller idea that requires an
additional hardware as discussed in previous chapters. The top level design of the
additional hardware is given in the Figure 7.3 and the total hardware is given in the
Figure 7.6. Although a behavioral design approach is used, truth tables and logic gates
are presented to visualize the hardware.
This is the first hardware implementation of the SMART scheme that shows the cost
of the changes in terms of area and speed. Therefore, there is no other work to
compare the study. However, a recent work is published named Sancus by Noorman
et. al. [6] that uses PC based memory controller hardware. A very similar hardware
implementation is presented by Sancus team [6]. If the Sancus memory controller
hardware scheme given in Figure 7.10 is compared with our design shown in the Figure
7.6, our design can be observed as a better implementation. Instead of using many Flip
Flops to keep PC, 16 bit for 8051, and hardware blocks to compare previous PC with
attestation code region boundaries, only one FF and a very smaller logic is used as
explained in the topic 7.2.
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Figure 5: Schematic of the Memory Access Logic (MAL),
the hardware used to enforce the memory access rules for
a single protected module.
operations. Finally, we describe the modifications we
made to the openMSP430 core itself.
Isolation. This part of the implementation deals with
enforcing the access rights shown in Table 1. For this
purpose, the processor needs access to the layout of ev-
ery software module that is currently protected. Since
the access rights need to be checked on every instruction,
accessing these values should be as fast as possible. For
this reason, we have decided to store the layout informa-
tion in special registers inside the processor. Note that
this means the total number of software modules that
can be protected at any particular time has a fixed upper
bound. This upper bound, NSM, can be configured when
synthesizing the processor.
Figure 5 gives an overview of the Memory Access
Logic (MAL) circuit used to enforce the access rights of
a single software module. This MAL circuit is instanti-
ated NSM times in the processor. It has four inputs: pc
and prev pc are the current and previous values of the
program counter, respectively. The input mab is the mem-
ory address bus – the address currently used for load or
store operations7 – while mb en indicates whether the
address bus is enabled for the current instruction. The
MAL circuit has one output, violation, that is asserted
whenever one of of the access rules is violated.
Apart from the input and output signals, the MAL cir-
cuit also keeps state in registers. The layout of the pro-
tected software module is captured in the TS (start of text
section), TE (end of text section), PS (start of protected
section) and PE (end of protected section) registers. The
EN register is set to 1 if there is currently a module being
protected by this MAL circuit instantiation. The layout
is saved in the registers when the protect instruction is
7Of course, this includes implicit memory accesses like a call
instruction.
called at which time EN is also set. When the unprotect
instruction is called, we just unset EN which disables all
checks.
In our prototype we load new modules through a debug
interface on the node and only the debug unit is allowed
to write to the memory region where text sections are
loaded. Therefore, the read-only nature of text sections
is already enforced and the MAL does not need to check
this. In a production implementation this check should be
added and would cost two additional comparators in the
MAL circuit.
Since the circuit is purely combinational, no extra cy-
cles are needed for the enforcement of access rights. As
explained above, this is exactly what we want since these
rights need to be checked for every instruction. The only
downside this approach might have is that this large com-
binational circuit may add to the length of the critical
path of the processor. We will show in Section 5 that
this is not the case. Note that since the MAL circuits are
instantiated in parallel, NSM does not influence the length
of the critical path.
Apart from hardware circuit blocks that enforce the
access rights, we also added a single hardware circuit
to control the MAL circuit instantiations. It implements
three tasks: (1) combine the violation signals from
every MAL instantiation into a single signal; (2) keep
track of the value of the current and previous program
counter; and (3) when the protect instruction is called,
select a free MAL instantiation to store the layout of the
new software module and assign it a unique ID.
Attestation. As explained in Section 3, two crypto-
graphic features are needed to implement our design:
the ability to create MACs and a key derivation func-
tion. Since our implementation is based on a small mi-
croprocessor, one of our main goals here is to make the
implementation of these features as small as possible.
The MAC algorithm we have chosen is HMAC, the
hash-based message authentication code. One of the rea-
sons we have chosen HMAC is its simplicity: only two
calls of a hash function are needed to calculate a MAC.
Another reason is that it serves as the basic building block
for HKDF [28], a key derivation function. This means a
lot of hardware can be shared between the implementa-
tions of the MAC and the key derivation function. For the
hash function, we have chosen to use SPONGENT because
it is one of the hash functions with the smallest hardware
footprint published to date [5]. More specifically, we
use the variant SPONGENT-128/128/8 implemented us-
ing a bit-parallel, word-serial architecture, which has a
small footprint while maintaining acceptable throughput.
Since SPONGENT-128/128/8 requires 8 bit inputs and the
openMSP430 architecture is 16 bit, an 8 bit buffer and
a tiny finite state machine are required to make the hash
Figure 7.10: Memory control hardware given by Sancus team in the p p r [6]
The effects of modifying the 8051 microprocessor hardware to implement SMART
scheme can be observed by investigating the Figure 7.11. It can be seen that the burden
of additional memory controller hardware is negligible (<%1) while a little cos comes
from the additional ROM of attestation code memory. The critical path is increased
very little that mainly comes from the secure reset mechanism.
It must be mentioned in here that the Dalton 8051 soft core is implem nted using
2 KB additional RAM. That is the reas n that the maximum cl ck frequency of the
implementation seems fast (55.972 MHz) when it is compared with its standard (12
MHz). The clock frequency of a standard implementation on XILINX V300PQ240
Virtex FPGA is show as 11.6 MHz by the designers [103] while the half of the area
is loaded with memory. Therefore, burden of SMART schem to a standard 8051
implementation will be much more smaller.
It can be observed by investigating hardware schematics that additional hardware
requires very minor changes and it is very compact since its inputs and outputs can
be connected to any processor in the same way.
The speed of the attestation is very important since it will be applied many times as a
burden to main duty of the embedded system. Restricting the system implementation
in a way that the attestation program can only use stack cannot reserve memory slows
execution significantly as discuss d in Chap r 6. Ther for most of the compilers of
low cost embedded systems are tend to globally address variables as much as they can
in default mode. Since the SMART scheme is proposed for very limited devices like
8051 modified versions of architecture are proposed. Modified versions of SMART
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Figure 7.11: Comparison of hardware implementations of SMART scheme and
non-modified 8051 core.
scheme is implemented and their cost are shown as compared in the Figure 7.11. An
additional RAM, whose accesses are restricted as key address space, is added for the
use of attestation code in a secure way. Moreover, the key is also placed to same
address space with the additional RAM and it is presented that proposed architecture
is better in terms of area and speed. As presented in the Figure 7.11 that proposed
approach uses smaller memory while the combinational hardware decreases.
77
78
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis deals with the analysis and design of trusted computing platforms on
lightweight embedded devices. We primarily focused on properties of implementation
of remote attestation on constrained embedded devices. SMART (Secure and Minimal
Architecture for Root of Trust) scheme, which is one of the state of the art methods
proposed by El Defrawy et al. [7], is examined and implemented using a soft-core 8051
microprocessor.
In Chapter 1, the importance of securely gaining assurance that a local or remote
computing platform behaves as expected is discussed and remote attestation is
explained as a solution. The lack of secure lightweight remote attestation scheme for
constraint embedded systems is discussed as an important problem.
In Chapter 3, the term software vulnerability is explained and some common attacks
are explained in order to show how easily a program can be successfully attacked.
Then, an overview of defense systems are shown.
In Chapter 4, the related work of defense mechanism for both high end devices and low
cost embedded devices are explained. It is shown that although there are a lot of work
for powerful computing devices like servers, there are only a small amount of work
on low cost devices. These techniques are discussed in three classes as software based
systems, hardware based systems and hardware-software based systems. It is explained
that a lot of successful attacks are realized on software based systems while hardware
based systems are too costly for the computing devices considered in the scope of
this thesis. Finally, it is shown that the idea of partitioning the programs and network
devices as modules and creating isolated processes for them is considered to be very
powerful. Recently proposed hardware-software based systems targeting the low cost
embedded devices [2, 5, 7] are explained. After investigating their properties, the idea
of integrating a PC based memory controller hardware to create isolated modules is
observed as very promising since it is effective and lightweight.
79
In Chapter 5, it is explained that SMART is a very promising approach using the idea
of creating isolated process using PC based memory controller in order to produce an
architecture that supports dynamic root of trust. An abstract architecture is given and
design rules for a secure design are explained.
In Chapter 6, software design of SMART scheme is explained. Hash algorithms are
compared and a lightweight version of SHA3 algorithm is chosen for the checksum
function of attestation code. Then, implementation trade-offs of SHA3 is presented
for 8051 platform using SDCC compiler. Ten different codes are designed using C and
ASM programming languages. Compiler properties are optimized using 8051 platform
specific properties. Finally, two different SMART attestation codes are designed and
considered as efficient after they are compared with literature. Although reserving
memory for the attestation code is not allowed in the proposed scheme in order to keep
minimality, the performance loss of designing a software that only uses stack for its
variables is shown in the Figure 6.7.
In Chapter 7, Dalton core [103] is used for the implementation of 8051 microprocessor
on a Xilinx Spartan 6 CGS324 FPGA. The architecture is modified for the need of
SMART scheme and the system is modified by obeying design rules. It is observed
that the SMART scheme doesn’t need too many changes to the existing architecture
and the cost mostly comes from the memories that attestation program and key are
stored.
In addition, a novel approach for the implementation of SMART scheme is
proposed. Not only the proposed architecture requires smaller additional hardware
but also it provides the capability of faster attestation algorithms. In the proposed
implementation, SMART architecture is modified in a way that attestation code can
reserve memory for its use. In order to achieve this, an exclusive additional RAM is
deployed into the internal RAM address space as an alternative memory for the use of
RC of SMART. As a second optimization, key memory is placed after RC exclusive
RAM in a same way and unified memory area of the key and RC exclusive RAM are
treated like the key address space of SMART architecture. This decreased the size
of additional memory controller hardware. Pure implementation of 8051, standard
SMART implementation and proposed architecture are compared, which is given in the
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Figure 7.11. It is presented that the proposed architecture fastened attestation program
by 12% with a smaller code by 36% for this design.
As a result, a very efficient implementation of SMART scheme is achieved using a
lightweight SHA3[r=40, c=169] algorithm for 8051 on a Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA.
The design properties of the scheme are investigated. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first implementation of SMART scheme. The SMART scheme is
published presenting two implementation examples. Although they talk about their
implementations on AVR and MSP430, the overhead of the system is not clearly
mentioned while the effort of implementation is discussed. Moreover, very efficient
SHA3[r=40, c=160] programs are designed for 8051 using ASM and C programming
languages. No other SHA3[200] implementation for 8051 can be found in the literature
at the time of this thesis is written. In addition to these, another approach that optimizes
both the hardware and software of SMART architecture is proposed and implemented
on 8051.
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